Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!lll-winken!lll-lcc!lll-tis!ames!think!bloom-beacon!gatech!uflorida!novavax!proxftl!bill From: bill@proxftl.UUCP (T. William Wells) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Free will does not require nondeterminism. Keywords: free will, determinism, cause Message-ID: <185@proxftl.UUCP> Date: 17 May 88 22:37:52 GMT Organization: Proximity Technology, Ft. Lauderdale Lines: 39 One common misconception I have seen on the subject of free will is that free will requires nondeterminism. It does not. I do not intend to be rigorous in this posting, that would be better done in talk.philosophy.misc or sci.philosophy.tech. My purpose in bringing this up is to open the discussion to the idea of free will in a deterministic entity. If you do want me to defend what I say, do not ask for it in this newsgroup. Instead, send me e-mail and if I get enough requests and have enough time (next year, maybe), I will deal with this in one of those groups. (I am being deliberately vague here, so that what I say can be interpreted by those with varying philosophical ideas.) A sufficient cause is a phenomena which requires that some other phenomena exist. We can say that if external (to the thing) phenomena are sufficient cause for the state of a thing and for its action in a given state then external phenomena are a sufficient cause of a things action. The absolute minimum required for free will is that there exists at least one action a thing can perform for which there is no external phenomena which are a sufficient cause. For if this is the case, then it is invalid to say that everything that the thing does is caused by external phenomena. Therefore, the thing itself must be considered as the cause of what it does (unless you admit the existence of uncaused action). This does not require that the thing could have done other than what it did, though it does not prohibit this, either. Thus free will (a specific kind of action supposed to be not determined by external phenomena) could exist even in a deterministic universe.