Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!lll-winken!lll-tis!ames!pasteur!ucbvax!COYOTE.STANFORD.EDU!eyal From: eyal@COYOTE.STANFORD.EDU (Eyal Mozes) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: Free Will and Self-Awareness Message-ID: <8805182232.AA29965@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU> Date: 18 May 88 22:05:22 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Lines: 40 In article <445@aiva.ed.ac.uk> jeff@aiva.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes: >>So, indirectly, even the obsession itself is under the person's >>volitional control. > >I would be interested in knowing what you think *isn't* under a >person's volitional control. One would normally think that having >a sore throat is not under conscious control even though one can >chose to do something about it or even to try to prevent it. Which is why I used the word "indirectly". You have direct volitional control only over your thoughts and actions; but this means that your physical and psychological health, your intelligence, your success etc., to the extent that your actions can affect them, are indirectly under your volitional control. >As far as you have explained so far, Rand's theory is little more >than simply saying that free will = the ability to focus consciousness, >which we can all observe. Since we can all observe this without the >aid of Rand's theory, all Rand seems to be saying is "that's all there >is to it". This is true in a sense, in that the choice to focus your consciousness or not is the only fundamental free-will choice. However, this choice leads to other, derivative choices, which include the choices of what to think about, what views and values to hold, and what actions to take. Whenever a person faces a decision about what view to hold on some issue, or about what action to take, that person may focus his thoughts on all relevant information and thus try to make an informed, rational decision; or he may make no such effort, deciding on the basis of what he happens to feel like at that moment; or he may deliberately avoid considering some of the relevant information, and make a decision based on evasion. In each case, his decision is based on some reasons, but, by choosing one of these three approaches, he has volitionally chosen what those reasons will be. Eyal Mozes BITNET: eyal%coyote@stanford ARPA: eyal@coyote.stanford.edu