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From: bill@proxftl.UUCP (T. William Wells)
Newsgroups: comp.ai,talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Free Will & Self-Awareness
Summary: a typical Objectivist with typical problems
Message-ID: <205@proxftl.UUCP>
Date: 22 May 88 02:22:57 GMT
References: <8805151907.AA01702@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU> <445@aiva.ed.ac.uk>
Organization: Proximity Technology, Ft. Lauderdale
Lines: 74

In article <445@aiva.ed.ac.uk>, jeff@aiva.ed.ac.uk (Jeff Dalton) writes:
> In article <8805092354.AA05852@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU> eyal@COYOTE.STANFORD.EDU (Eyal Mozes) writes:
>...
> As far as you have explained so far, Rand's theory is little more
> than simply saying that free will = the ability to focus consciousness,
> which we can all observe.  Since we can all observe this without the
> aid of Rand's theory, all Rand seems to be saying is "that's all there
> is to it".
>
> -- Jeff

Actually, from what I have read so far, it seems that the two of
you are arguing different things; moreover, eyal@COYOTE.STANFORD
.EDU (Eyal Mozes) has committed, at the very least, a sin of
omission: he has not explained Rand's theory of free will
adequately.

Following is the Objectivist position as I understand it.  Please
be aware that I have not included everything needed to justify
this position, nor have I been as technically correct as I might
have been; my purpose here is to trash a debate which seems to be
based on misunderstandings.

To those of you who want a justification, I will (given enough
interest) eventually be doing so on talk.philosophy.misc, where I
hope to be continuing my discussion of Objectivism.  Please
direct any followups to that group.

Entities are the only causes: they cause their actions.  Their
actions may be done to other entities, and this may require the
acted on entity to cause itself to act in some way.  In that
case, one can use `cause' in a derivative sense, saying: the
acting entities (the agents) caused the acted upon entities (the
patient) to act in a certain way.  One can also use `cause' to
refer to a chain of such.  This derivative sense is the normal
use for the word `cause', and there is always an implied action.

If, in order that an entity can act in some way, other entities
must act on it, then those agents are a necessary cause for the
patient's action.  If, given a certain set of actions performed
by some entities, a patient will act in a certain way, then those
agents are a sufficient cause for the patient's actions.

The Objectivist version of free will asserts that there are (for
a normally functioning human being) no sufficient causes for what
he thinks.  There are, however, necessary causes for it.

This means that while talking about thinking, no statement of the
form "X(s) caused me to think..." is an valid statement about
what is going on.

In terms of the actual process, what happens is this: various
entities provide the material which you base your thinking on
(and are thus necessary causes for what you think), but an
action, not necessitated by other entities, is necessary to
direct your thinking.  This action, which you cause, is
volition.

> But where does the "subject of your own choice" come from?  I wasn't
> thinking of letting one's thoughts wander, although what I said might
> be interpreted that way.  When you decide what to think about, did
> you decide to decide to think about *that thing*, and if so how did
> you decide to decide to decide, and so on?

Shades of Zeno!  One does not "decide to decide" except when one
does so in an explicit sense.  ("I was waffling all day; later
that evening I put my mental foot down and decided to decide once
and for all.") Rather, you perform an act on your thoughts to
direct them in some way; the name for that act is "decision".

Anyway, in summary, Rand's theory is not just that "free will =
the ability to focus consciousness" (actually, to direct certain
parts of one's consciousness), but that this act is not
necessitated by other entities.