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From: gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton)
Newsgroups: comp.ai,talk.philosophy.misc
Subject: Re: Free Will & Self-Awareness
Message-ID: <1226@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk>
Date: 24 May 88 08:18:21 GMT
References: <8805151907.AA01702@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU> <445@aiva.ed.ac.uk> <205@proxftl.UUCP>
Reply-To: gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton)
Organization: Comp Sci, Glasgow Univ, Scotland
Lines: 16

In article <205@proxftl.UUCP> bill@proxftl.UUCP (T. William Wells) writes:
>interest) eventually be doing so on talk.philosophy.misc, 
>Please direct any followups to that group.
Can I please just ask one thing here, as it is relevant?
>
>The Objectivist version of free will asserts that there are (for
>a normally functioning human being) no sufficient causes for what
>he thinks.  There are, however, necessary causes for it.
Has this any bearing on the ability of a machine to simulate human
decision making?  It appears so, but I'd be interested in how you think it
can be extended to yes/no/don't know about the "pure" AI endeavour.
-- 
Gilbert Cockton, Department of Computing Science,  The University, Glasgow
	gilbert@uk.ac.glasgow.cs <europe>!ukc!glasgow!gilbert

	     The proper object of the study of humanity is humans, not machines