Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!lll-winken!lll-tis!helios.ee.lbl.gov!pasteur!ames!mailrus!uflorida!novavax!proxftl!bill
From: bill@proxftl.UUCP (T. William Wells)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: How to dispose of the free will issue (long)
Keywords: free will architecture terminology
Message-ID: <501@proxftl.UUCP>
Date: 20 Jul 88 09:41:03 GMT
References: <11906@agate.BERKELEY.EDU> <406@ns.ns.com>
Reply-To: bill@proxftl.UUCP (T. William Wells)
Organization: Proximity Technology, Ft. Lauderdale
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In article <11906@agate.BERKELEY.EDU> gsmith@garnet.berkeley.edu (Gene W. Smith) writes:
> In article <445@proxftl.UUCP>, bill@proxftl (T. William Wells) writes:
>
> >Pick your favorite definition of free will. Unless it is one
> >where the "free will" has no causal relationship with the rest
> >of the world (but then why does it matter?), the existence or
> >lack of existence of free will will have measurable consequences.
>
>   Having a causal connection to the rest of the world is not the
> same as having measurable consequences, so this argument won't
> work.

This may be true in general, however, it is not relevant to the
issue at hand.  Should something which affects ourselves be not
measurable, by what means can we assert that it be causal?

>       One possible definition of free will (with problems, but
> don't let that worry us) is that there is no function (from
> possible internal+external states to behavior, say) which
> determines what the free will agent will do.

That does not agree to my idea of `causally related'. In fact,
I could almost use your phrase as a description of `causally
unrelated'.

---

I think that I shall bow out of the debate on free will.  My
original intent was to inject a few ideas which I had not seen
discussed before and to see what was done with them, not to
debate my own view on the subject.  I do not really have the time
for that.

Worse, I find that I have the choice between spouting vague
generalities and making definite assertions based on my own
philosophy.  Since my philosophy is derived from Objectivism my
doing the latter is guaranteed to generate lots of smoke and very
little light.

For example, ddb@ns.ns.com (David Dyer-Bennet) writes:

>  Yep, that's what you'd need to have to take the debate out of the
>religious and into the practical.  Not meaning to sound sarcastic, but
>this is a monumental philosophical breathrough.  But could you exhibit
>some of the difficult pieces of this theory; in particular, what is
>the measurable difference between an action taken freely, and one that
>was pre-determined by other forces?

Should I answer him in vague generalities?  To do so would not be
responsive.  Should I give him my views?  Should I suggest that
there is an invalid premise in the way that his question is
phrased?  (It seems that he would like me to show what the
difference is in the action, but the difference is not in the
action but in the cause.) If I do so without explaining the
philosophical positions on which they are based, I'll fail to
demonstrate my point.  If I do try to explain my philosophy,
we'll get completely off the subject.

So, bye for now and happy debating!