Xref: utzoo comp.ai:2053 sci.philosophy.tech:692
Path: utzoo!utgpu!water!watmath!clyde!bellcore!rutgers!gatech!uflorida!novavax!maddoxt
From: maddoxt@novavax.UUCP (Thomas Maddox)
Newsgroups: comp.ai,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: How to dispose of naive science types (short)
Keywords: unproveable theories
Message-ID: <632@novavax.UUCP>
Date: 23 Jul 88 17:43:44 GMT
References: <483@cvaxa.sussex.ac.uk> <794@l.cc.purdue.edu> <488@aiva.ed.ac.uk> <1496@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk> <531@ns.UUCP>
Reply-To: maddoxt@novavax.UUCP (Thomas Maddox)
Organization: Nova University, Fort Lauderdale, Florida
Lines: 15

In article <531@ns.UUCP> logajan@ns.UUCP (John Logajan x3118) writes:
>gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) writes:
>> logajan@ns.UUCP (John Logajan x3118) writes:
[Cockton]
>> most of your theories [...] will be unproven,
>> and unproveable, if only for practical reasons.
[Logajan]
>Theories that are by their nature unproveable are completely different from
>theories that are as of yet unproven.  

	I believe that Gilbert Cockton is not discriminating between
assumptions (and their close relatives, hypotheses) and theories,
proven or otherwise.  John Loganjan's comment comes in at a higher
conceptual level where one presumes the assumption/theory distinction
has been made.