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From: kmont@hpindda.HP.COM (Kevin Montgomery)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: Intelligence / Consciousness Test for Machines (Neural-Nets)???
Message-ID: <3430002@hpindda.HP.COM>
Date: 11 Oct 88 19:19:01 GMT
References: <1141@usfvax2.EDU>
Organization: HP Information Networks, Cupertino, CA
Lines: 49

(sorry about the previous repost of the last response)

In article <1141@usfvax2.EDU>, mician@usfvax2.BITNET writes:
> When can a machine be considered a conscious entity?

May I suggest that this discussion be moved to talk.philosophy?

While it has many implications to AI (as do most of the more
philosophical arguments which take place in comp.ai), it has a
broader scope and should have a broader reader base.  There are
a number of implications of a definition of consciousness-
rights and responsibilities of something deemed conscious, whether
mere consciousness is a sufficient criterion for personhood 
(should non-biological entities be deemed conscious, and if 
consciousness is sufficient for personhood, and the constitutional
rights are bestowed upon persons "born" in a country, then these 
entities have all the rights of the constitution (in this country)).

The implication of this example would be that if machines (or animals, 
or any non-human or non-biological entity) have rights, then one may
be arrested for murder if one should halt the "life process" of 
such an entity either by killing an animal or by removing power
from a machine.

Moreover, the question of when humans are conscious (and thus are
arguably persons) has implications in the areas of abortion, euthanasia,
human rights, and other areas.

For these reasons, I suggest we drop over to talk.philosophy (VERY
low traffic over there, anyway), resolve these questions (if possible,
but doubtful), and post a response to the interested newsgroups (comp.ai,
talk.abortion, etc).

Rather than attacking all questions at once and getting quite confused 
in the process, I suggest that we start with the question of whether
consciousness is a necessary and sufficient criterion for personhood.
In other words, in order to have rights (such as the right to life),
does something have to have consciousness?  Perhaps we should start
with a definition of consciousness and personhood, and revise these
as we see fit (would someone with a reputable dictionary handy post 
one there?).

Note that there are implications about things such as anencephalic
babies (born with only the medulla, no higher brain areas exist),
commissurotomy (split-brain) patients, and even people we consider
to be knocked unconscious (or even sleeping!) have personhood 
(and therefore rights).

				kevin