Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!mcvax!ukc!etive!aipna!rjc
From: rjc@aipna.ed.ac.uk (Richard Caley)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: Artificial Intelligence and Intelligence
Message-ID: <377@aipna.ed.ac.uk>
Date: 7 Dec 88 08:05:41 GMT
References: <562@metapsy.UUCP> <2732@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu> <563@metapsy.UUCP>
Reply-To: rjc@uk.ac.ed.aipna (Richard Caley)
Organization: Dept. of AI, Edinburgh, UK
Lines: 54
Dragon: Yevaud

In article <563@metapsy.UUCP> sarge@metapsy.UUCP (Sarge Gerbode) writes:

>I don't need a mechanistic explanation of my own behavior (much of
>it, at least), because I am directly aware of causing it by
>intention.

It is precisly because of this I need an expalanation. I have a
reasonably strong belief in causality and without an explanation I am
reduced to talking about "intention" or something similar as a magical
something to break the causal chain at me. 

>Furthermore, the most major observable difference between
>myself and a machine is that the latter is explainable in mechanistic
>terms, whereas I am not.  On the other hand, if I could explain
>*your* behavior entirely on mechanistic grounds, then I think I would
>have grounds (Occam's Razor) for not attributing subjectivity to
>you.

Come on, I can not explain al the beaviour of the global weather system
on mechanistic grounds - in fact, nobody can at this time. does this
mean we have to go back to rain gods and thunder gods, atributing
'subjectivity' to the weather.

I would chalange you to expalain the behaviour of the computer on which
you read this on mechanistic grounds. I can't. In fact until the
physicists have solved all tehir problems no one will be able to. By
your own argument. . . .

>It is because others are observably *not* machines,
>not explainable in mechanistic terms, that we attribute subjectivity
>(and humanity) to them, in order to explain their behavior.

Defining subjectivity as humanity is rather a good way of wining the
argument. However, this is usually called "cheating". I can prove that
it is impossible to sit on a stool by defining the property of being a
seat as being "chairness" and so since stools are not chairs . . .

>People don't like to be manipulated, programed, treated like machines,
>and part of the reason why is, I believe, that they have an immediate
>awareness of themselves as not being mechanistically determined, and
>that sort of treatment observably embodies a lie.


This does not make them correct.

People believe all sorts of things. I believe that pushing something
twice as hard makes it go twice as fast. This is incorrect, but it gets
me around the supermarket with my trolly so what the hell.

-- 
	rjc@uk.ac.ed.aipna	AKA	rjc%uk.ac.ed.aipna@nss.cs.ucl.ac.uk

"We must retain the ability to strike deep into the heart of Edinburgh"
		- MoD