Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!husc6!cfa!ward
From: ward@cfa.harvard.EDU (Steve Ward)
Newsgroups: comp.periphs
Subject: Re: SCSI CAM Questions
Summary: CAM should not deal with OS security
Message-ID: <1365@cfa.cfa.harvard.EDU>
Date: 25 Dec 88 02:11:13 GMT
References: <12872@cup.portal.com>
Organization: Harvard-Smithsonian
Lines: 18


I think that CAM ought to be kept lean and mean and as OS independent
as possible.  I do not want CAM itself to deal with OS security as
this will complicate it and invariably make it less portable.

Each OS implementation can deal with security as it sees fit.  Two
possible ways:  first, make CAM access privileged, but if you have
permission, you can get at all of CAM.  This is like system privilege
in most OS's.  Second, implement a "system OS front end" to CAM.
CAM is privileged, but access is indirect through the OS so that
privileged access can be refined and controlled on a device by
device basis and even by requested operation.

In any case, CAM should be designed for efficiency, simplicity,
and portability so that it can move from simple embedded applications
to larger OS's with a minimum of porting grief.

Steve W.   ward@cfa.harvard.edu