Path: utzoo!utgpu!watmath!clyde!att!osu-cis!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!rutgers!cmcl2!adm!smoke!gwyn
From: gwyn@smoke.BRL.MIL (Doug Gwyn )
Newsgroups: comp.unix.wizards
Subject: Re: Password security - Another idea
Message-ID: <9261@smoke.BRL.MIL>
Date: 2 Jan 89 05:03:13 GMT
References: <228@sea375.UUCP> <4497@xenna.Encore.COM> <2271@pompeii.cs.swarthmore.edu> <4523@xenna.Encore.COM>
Reply-To: gwyn@brl.arpa (Doug Gwyn (VLD/VMB) <gwyn>)
Organization: Ballistic Research Lab (BRL), APG, MD.
Lines: 16

In article <4523@xenna.Encore.COM> bzs@Encore.COM (Barry Shein) writes:
>Can we assume that before we make exotic changes like shadow passwords
>we can make simple changes (some Unix's already have these) to the
>passwd changing programs like: ...

NO!  The "easy-to-guess password" checks are not sufficient, and
the accompanying restrictions are a royal pain in the user's ass.
It has been argued that they result in REDUCED security!

Exposing the encrypted password for anyone to see is FOLLY; it was
barely excusable in the first place and is inexcusable now.  The
shadow password file (which is NOT "exotic"; in fact JHU/BRL PDP-11
UNIX had something of the sort many years ago) has already been
implemented; so long as UNIX sticks to the general modified DES
encryption scheme, hiding the encrypted passwords is a necessary
security measure.