Xref: utzoo comp.ai:3146 talk.philosophy.misc:1868 sci.lang:3983 Path: utzoo!utgpu!attcan!uunet!lll-winken!lll-lcc!ncis.llnl.gov!helios.ee.lbl.gov!nosc!ucsd!rutgers!att!ihlpb!arm From: arm@ihlpb.ATT.COM (Macalalad) Newsgroups: comp.ai,talk.philosophy.misc,sci.lang Subject: Re: Categorization Message-ID: <9450@ihlpb.ATT.COM> Date: 20 Jan 89 20:29:33 GMT References: <681@cogsci.ucsd.EDU> <2959@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu> <2899@xyzzy.UUCP> Reply-To: arm@ihlpb.UUCP (55528-Macalalad,A.R.) Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories - Naperville, Illinois Lines: 62 In the ongoing discussion of categorization, there seems to be two different types of categorization: 1. An "arbitrary" type of categorization, arbitrary in the sense that the same object may be categorized one way in one situation but in another situation may be categorized some other way. For example, a kid may describe his bike as "big" in comparison to his little sister's tricycle, but "small" compared to his big brother's ten speed. His bike's size is arbitrarily categorized. 2. The "classical" type of categorization, where an object is categorized one way, 100% all-or-none. Now no one, not even Stevan Harnad, denies the existence of (1). But there has been much debate, and much confusion about (2). My claim is that the existence of (2) would just add unnecessary complexity to any theory of categorization, and unless Harnad has some compelling evidence to the contrary, which he has not yet brought forth, I further claim that (1) is sufficient. Remember that even though (1) is labeled "arbitrary" categories, it does not follow that these categories are meaningless. When that kid is telling his little sister's friends that his bike is "big," he's telling them that his bike is bigger than any of their little tricycles. And when he tells his dad that his bike is "small," he's implying that he needs a bigger bike, like his brother's ten speed. The categories then are not so much arbitrary as they are dependent on the situation and the information that they convey. Thus, you can still apply a rule for categorization, such as "x is big if x is bigger than a tricycle." The rules vary with the situation. (Note that I'm not suggesting a cognitive theory where we actually apply rules for categorization. I'm merely saying that if we attempted to come up with a rule for our internal categories, these rules would vary with the situation.) Now consider the category "bird" which has been proposed as a classical category. A boy may point to a flying object and say to his friend, "Look at that bird." Later on, when the object flies closer, he may say, "Oh,that's no bird. That's a bat." Under classical categorization, as I understand it, the boy committed a miscategorization, which he later corrected. However, the boy didn't learn anything new about the category. He was just as capable of distinguishing between a bird and a bat before and after. I would argue that instead, the boy was applying two different rules. The first was something like, "If there's a distant flying object that has wings flapping up and down and a head and a body, then it's a bird." And presumably the categorization was appropriate enough for his friend to recognize what object he was talking about. Once the object was closer and provided his senses with more detail, he could apply a different rule which yielded more information about the object. Actually, (2) could be a special case of (1), where only one rule is applied in every situation. So even if (2) did exist, (1) would still be sufficient. Comments? -Alex