Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!lll-winken!ncis.llnl.gov!ncis!afit-ab!wbralick From: wbralick@afit-ab.arpa (William A. Bralick) Newsgroups: comp.misc Subject: Re: USSR International Computer Club (was: Information on the ICC) Summary: (long) Message-ID: <825@afit-ab.arpa> Date: 19 Jan 89 04:28:09 GMT References: <10127@well.UUCP> <1315@orion.cf.uci.edu> <810@afit-ab.arpa> <10870@umn-cs.CS.UMN.EDU> <824@afit-ab.arpa> <1560@cps3xx.UUCP> Reply-To: wbralick@blackbird.afit.af.mil (William A. Bralick) Distribution: na Organization: Air Force Institute of Technology; WPAFB, OH Lines: 108 In article <1560@cps3xx.UUCP> rang@cpswh.cps.msu.edu (Anton Rang) writes: >In article <824@afit-ab.arpa> wbralick@afit-ab.arpa (William A. Bralick) writes: > )>Once again, how do you prevent object and source code from being exported )>to the Soviet Union? This is export-controlled technology. Anything )>that can be done to raise the Soviet's cost of acquiring said technology )>is a good thing. The only exception is that if the government decides )>that the Soviet Union should have certain technology, or free access to )>technology in general, then the formation of a group can be done in )>accordance with USENET rules. ) ) First, I'd like to say that I disagree with one of the premises in )the above statement. Which one? )That out of the way...the problem of controlling )technology transfer belongs to the government, not the net. Let us say that the government makes it illegal for an American to supply high technology products (e.g. M68020 processors, Ada compilers, whatever) to the Soviet Union. It is now incumbent on American citizens to avoid transferring high technology to the USSR. If one chooses to supply such technology to the Soviets, then one can be prosecuted for violating the export control restrictions. The bottom line is that the problem of controlling one's own behavior (in compliance with applicable laws) rests with the individual. )If I mail )a package to the U.S.S.R., the government will presumably check that )it doesn't have anything which is sensitive in it. If I give it to a )friend in, say, Nicaragua, the U.S. government wouldn't see it. But )that's a government problem Let's say an individual mails a package to the USSR, and the government fails to recognize the book in the package as a copy of, say, detailed design documentation for a US "spy" satellite, and lets the package through. You contend that the individual has done nothing wrong, or that the government's failure to catch the individual exonerates him. Actually, it's your problem. If you give a package to someone in Nicaragua for transshipment to the USSR, and it contains export- controlled technology, then upon your arrival back in the States you are subject to criminal sanctions. Violation of the export-control laws, possibly conspiracy, possibly espionage (if the technology is of that nature). )--I'm not prevented from mailing packages )to the U.S.S.R. just because they *might* contain sensitive data. ) But you should prevent yourself from mailing any packages to the USSR that *do* contain sensitive data. Our federal government makes foreign policy -- it is not the job of American citizens to unmake or remake it unless elected or appointed (and confirmed) to such a position. ) ) Umm, last I checked USENET was not a United States-only system. If )somebody in, say, England wants to set up a connection to the )U.S.S.R., is the US going to stop them? How? No. That would be Mrs. Thatcher's responsibility. I believe that we have agreements with the relevant governments to prevent these transfers, that's why there was a problem with Toshiba selling advanced milling machines and some European company (whose name escapes me) selling the control equipment to the USSR. )(Heck, somebody may )have a USENET connection over there right now--do *you* know where )every computer on USENET is?) I don't *think* that there are any connections to Iron Curtain countries at this time. ) If the government is worried about this, they could monitor overseas )links. Or maybe a solution would be to have a single system hung off )the backbone which will serve *only* as a gateway to a single machine )in the U.S.S.R. It could even be run by the government. My point is that the federal government (or as you correctly point out several governments) have a role here. And that means a veto over the whole notion. Which agency to contact is the next question. )(Creating a )newsgroup called comp.icc, incidentally, isn't the issue here--the )issue is connecting USENET to the U.S.S.R., no matter how the )connection is made). This is, of course, correct. I thought that the whole point of having a "comp.icc" was to directly connect with the USSR, but the issue *is* whether to connect with the Soviet Union. BTW, if it ever does happen, comp.icc is too cryptic anyway; new netters may have little idea just who they are talking to. How about comp.gulag, or comp.totalitarian? I guess that a comp.icc group that talked *about* the Soviet net would be fine as long as the Soviets were not connected. I just say no. Regards, -- Will Bralick : wbralick@afit-ab.arpa | If we desire to defeat the enemy, Air Force Institute of Technology, | we must proportion our efforts to | his powers of resistance. with disclaimer; use disclaimer; | - Carl von Clauswitz