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From: turpin@cs.utexas.edu (Russell Turpin)
Newsgroups: sci.bio
Subject: Re: Creationism as a science...
Summary: Cutting the unnecessary "metaphysics".
Message-ID: <4594@cs.utexas.edu>
Date: 18 Jan 89 21:39:10 GMT
References: <sXnAyBy00W0LI1xVpf@andrew.cmu.edu> <761@bimacs.BITNET>
Organization: U. Texas CS Dept., Austin, Texas
Lines: 36

In article <sXnAyBy00W0LI1xVpf@andrew.cmu.edu> rg20+@andrew.cmu.edu (Rick Francis Golembiewski) writes:
> >The problem with Creationism as a science, is that you can't really use it to
> >make a prediction (which you CAN do with Darwinism, it might not be correct,
> >but that goes into the definition of a theory).  Why can't you make any kind
> >of predictions with Creationism?  Well, mainly because it deals with God,

In article <761@bimacs.BITNET>, kanov@bimacs.BITNET (Mechael Kanovsky) writes:
> What if we say that first g-d created the universe (creatism) and then
> he let nature i.e. darwinism take over or in other words he also
> craeted the rules that govern the universe and upon those rules we
> could make predictions.

Unless you demonstrate that god had to decree precisely the laws
that your theory contains, the claims about god laying down the
rules are just "metaphysical" baggage.  One might as well append
to Maxwell's equations a story of the invisible elves that cause
the electromagnetic field to behave as Maxwell's equations
predict.  The problem in both cases is that only the "physical"
part of the theory is involved in making predictions, and so it
is the only part of the theory that is tested by observation.
Both elves and gods are useless in this regard.  The elves and
gods would be just as happy involved with some other theory, and
so the success or failure of the theory is irrelevant to claims
about them.  

The separation between physical theory (whose predictions are
tested against observation) and metaphysical baggage is not
always so clear.  The different schools of physicists have long
argued over the meaning of quantum mechanics, and over which
claims are part of the theory and which are not.  Some try to
step aside from the battle by claiming that it is clear how to
calculate predictions from QM, regardless of which interpretation
one chooses, and that this is all that matters.  Others disagree:
David Deutsch describes experiments that would distinguish the
many-worlds interpretation from the standard interpretation. 

Russell