Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!lll-winken!ncis.llnl.gov!helios.ee.lbl.gov!nosc!humu!uhccux!lee From: lee@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu (Greg Lee) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: Biological Categorization Message-ID: <3039@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu> Date: 22 Jan 89 14:19:34 GMT References: Organization: University of Hawaii Lines: 30 From article , by harnad@elbereth.rutgers.edu (Stevan Harnad): " ... " No symbol grounding theory (including my own) -- at least no " non-positivistic one -- would require either laymen or scientists to " speak exclusively in an observation language. You underestimate Positivism, of which in fact your theory appears to be a species. Here is a passage from Moritz Schlick's "Positivism and Realism" (1932/3,in Ayer, _Logical Positivism_): "But when do I understand a proposition? When I understand the meanings of the words which occur in it? These can be explained by definitions. But in the definitions new words appear whose meanings cannot again be described in propositions, they must be indicated directly: the meaning of a word must in the end be _shown_, it must be _given_. This is done by an act of indication, of pointing; and what is pointed at must be given, otherwise I cannot be referred to it." " But their terms must " somehow be GROUNDED in observations, otherwise how is one to say " whether or not the categorization is "correct"? (In fact, how is one " otherwise even to know what the words mean? Unless grounded somehow " is something other than words, they are just meaningless strings " of symbols. ... Except that even Schlick allows grounding in *possible* experiences, I see no notable differences from your views. For a recent argument against applying this approach to natural language, see Chomsky's review of Skinner's _Verbal Behavior_. Greg, lee@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu