Xref: utzoo comp.ai:3182 talk.philosophy.misc:1882 sci.lang:4013 Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!lll-winken!ames!xanth!mcnc!rti!xyzzy!throopw From: throopw@xyzzy.UUCP (Wayne A. Throop) Newsgroups: comp.ai,talk.philosophy.misc,sci.lang Subject: Re: Categorization Message-ID: <3028@xyzzy.UUCP> Date: 23 Jan 89 18:01:19 GMT References: <681@cogsci.ucsd.EDU> <2959@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu> <2899@xyzzy.UUCP> Organization: Data General, RTP NC. Lines: 114 > harnad@elbereth.rutgers.edu (Stevan Harnad) > In my posting I distinguished two senses in which a category might be > arbitrary; the first was because it did not pick out a "natural kind" Yes... what I was calling arbitrary categorization (as opposed to an arbitrary category). > and the second was because it was merely subjective. Yes... what I was calling an arbitrary category. By "categorization", I meant the feature(s) that pick(s) out a category. By "arbitrary categorization" I meant that the features chosen from some set of possibilities might seem, to some observers at least, to be chosen without motive or "at random". The point I was trying to make here is that there are no non-arbitrary categorizations. This is because it is simply a mistake to suppose that one categorization (choice of distinguishing feature) is any more "natural" than another. All useable distinguishing features have effects of some sort. If they did not, they could not be observed. The "importance" or "naturalness" of these features is based purely on the goals and motives of the categorizer, and thus can appear motiveless to an observer with goals and motives that make the effect irrelevant. By "arbitrary category" I meant that the basis for inclusion could not be objectively determined, and thus seemed "random". The point I was trying to make here is that there are no arbitrary categories. This is because it is always possible to "objectify" a category based on subjective grounds, by the "inspector 12" method. "It don't say (it's in category X) until *I* say it says (it's in category X)." Two potential objections arise: First, this is only objective to other people, not to inspector 12. I disagree. Inspector 12 can objectively determine what inspector 12 utters. Second, others cannot, in the absense of inspector 12, make the categorization. But then, people cannot make the categorization "colored ultraviolet" on objects without bees, or artificial instruments, or whatnot. I don't see that it makes a fundamental difference whether a particular "category detector" such as "this scene is good/bad looking", or this "flower smells good/bad" needs a particular person or instrument to act as oracle. In other words, the claim that such categories are "really baseless" is insupportable, because the person involved may very well be making the judgement objectively by criteria that other observers cannot perceive, as a person who has had the cornea removed might make the judgement "ultraviolet colored" and appear to be choosing totally at random to all "normal" persons. On to other points. > I suggested that the > first sense of "arbitrary" was not relevant to the problem of how > categories were internally represented, because a category might be > arbitrary in the first sense, yet still be based on classical > features I agree, but for a much stronger reason, as one can see from my argument above. > Subjective categories, on the other hand ("looks pretty to me," > "reminds me of his sister") are arbitrary in the second sense, in that > there may indeed exist no objective invariant features "out there" whose > presence or absence is guiding the judgment. I disagree, unless the categorizer is lying or confused. Either the object really bears some resemblance (or has some other property which evokes memory of the categorizers female sibling) or it does not. Just because every Tom, Dick and Harry can't pick out these objective features is as irrelevant as whether Tom, Dick or Harry can see gamma rays. > When a category-name, such as "arbitrary," is applied to "everything," > it fails to be informative Agreed, but then I didn't apply it to "everything". I applied it to what I called "categorizations". Dealing with various "Dumpty" issues, I point out that a categorizer oracle for "Dumpty finds X pretty" is not arbitrary as I outlined above... counterpoints raised to this position tend to involve Dumpty lying, or involve the fact that Dumpty's tastes can change over time. I don't see that either of these are relevant, since by analogy, a geiger counter can be improperly calibrated and "lie", and it's calibration can change over time and drift. This doesn't matter in categorizing radioactive materials in the abstract, and it shouldn't matter in categorizing things-Dumpty-finds-pretty in the abstract. ( Now, there is one way of arriving at a category which is truely arbitrary in the second sense, but it doesn't involve "subjectivity" or "Dumptyness". It involves categorizing photons on where they strike a screen after passing through slits which cause interference (or some other quantum-mechanical-determined outcome). Current understanding says that these events really are arbitrary and causeless in the strongest sense. But I'm not really prepared to deal with this case, and it doesn't seem to belong to the domain of discussion anyway, which is how folks categorize in the everyday world. ) >> it may well be that people in practice don't categorize in order to >> derive "X-is-like-Y" measures, but rather pseudocategorize according to >> these measures. > I can't understand this point. To me, to categorize is to sort > instances in a reliable, correct, objective, all-or-none fashion. What I'm saying is that other people may not mean the same thing that you do when they use the world "categorize". This does not necessarily mean that they are "wrong". -- I mean, where do you even FIND a Jewish hard-line conservative Republican pot-smoker? --- A. Whitney Brown -- Wayne Throop !mcnc!rti!xyzzy!throopw