Xref: utzoo comp.ai:3252 talk.philosophy.misc:1934 sci.lang:4044 Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!ukma!rutgers!mcnc!rti!xyzzy!throopw From: throopw@xyzzy.UUCP (Wayne A. Throop) Newsgroups: comp.ai,talk.philosophy.misc,sci.lang Subject: Re: Categorization Message-ID: <3110@xyzzy.UUCP> Date: 30 Jan 89 17:38:55 GMT References: <681@cogsci.ucsd.EDU> <2959@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu> <2899@xyzzy.UUCP> <9750@bcsaic.UUCP> Organization: Data General, RTP NC. Lines: 39 > harnad@elbereth.rutgers.edu (Stevan Harnad) > Nor will how we categorize in most cases be determined from our > introspective discourse about how we categorize, [...] > The explanation will come from theoretical inference and > the building and testing of causal models for the underlying > mechanism. I quite agree, mod a few nits about "THE explanation" as opposed to "well founded explanations" or "scientific explanations". > What are the internal representations that allow us to categorize > members and nonmembers of these categories successfully, in those many > cases in which we are able to do so? It is those who ignore (or take > for granted) this enormous core of reliable, correct, all-or-none > categorization performance who are not showing due "regard for the way > humans actually assign categories." Here, however, I'm not so sure I agree fully. To be specific, while it is indeed the case that "those who ignore" sharp-seeming categorizations are not "showing due 'regard'" (etc), it is NOT the case that all those who propose fuzzy internal representations of categories ignore this evidence. It is, after all, a plausible hypothesis that the "all-or-none" nature of some human categorization is due to there being no actual objects occupying fuzzy ground around fuzzy internal categories, instead of because the internal categories are non-fuzzy but the sensory evidence is ambiguous or insufficent to resolve the non-fuzzy question. In fact, I personally suspect that there is a mix of strategies and internal representations, at various "levels" and degrees of "automaticness". However that may be, I see no particular evidence upon which to base the "theoretical inference" that human internal category representation is non-fuzzy. The point is that while fuzzness is far from established confidently, the same is true of crispness. -- When asked how to pronounce his name, Nicklaus Wirth replied, "You can call me by name, 'virt', or call me by value, 'worth'.". -- Wayne Throop !mcnc!rti!xyzzy!throopw