Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!ncrlnk!ncrcae!hubcap!gatech!cwjcc!ukma!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!osu-cis!att!cbnews!howard@cos.com From: howard@cos.com (Howard C. Berkowitz) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Re: Are Aircraft Carriers Obsolete ? Message-ID: <3235@cbnews.ATT.COM> Date: 18 Jan 89 22:32:28 GMT Sender: military@cbnews.ATT.COM Lines: 108 Approved: military@att.att.com I wanted to follow up on the "Are Aircraft Carriers Obsolete" discussion, by offering some context for the geopolitical use of carriers. The context here does involve some "political" references, but they are from the context of a (perhaps dated) graduate curriculum in national security policy ("political engineering?"). In the present politicomilitary world, I believe there is a legitimate reason to have aircraft carriers. I also believe there is a legitimate reason to have ICBM's, to have Special Forces in their original role as guerilla leaders, to have special operations combat units such as SEALs and Rangers, etc. Each of these is useful in one or more specific conflict scenarios, and useless in others. We need a mix. The original poster states "In a global conflict, the aircraft carriers would all be destroyed immediately by missiles. A missile costs a lot less than an aircraft carrier." Before more general comments, some specific responses are appropriate here. As you pointed out, relatively small tactical cruise missiles cannot sink carriers when equipped with conventional warheads. There is an additional question besides the missile: what is its launching platform? My limited experience with strategic missiles suggests it is completely impractical to develop trajectories, in real time, which would allow ballistic or TERCOM missiles to hit mobile targets. Realistically, carriers, in a global conflict, would have to be engaged by missiles from air, surface, or underwater platforms. Each platform type has its own problems: long-range aircraft can be detected by AEW radar aircraft, surveillance of their bases, etc., and then engaged by F-14's and long range SAM's, hopefully before they come into missile range. Surface platforms can be located by the same surveillance satellites used to locate carriers, and, if the carriers are in open water (!), can engage surface missile carriers at long range. Submarines have practical limitations of seeing their targets, and being vectored to them due to communications limitations. I don't say a carrier battle group is invulnerable -- it is not -- but it is a significantly different problem than the British in the Falklands (e.g., MUCH longer detection and engagement range). > More generally, the original poster assumes all conflict immediately escalates to "global," and there are no practical intermediate levels (I am not referring here to limited nuclear conflict). World history from 1945 to the present certainly counters this argument; there are innumerable examples of limited war. According to Clausewitz, war is an extension of national policy by military means. But what is national policy? This differs with national "style," the best simple breakdown of which is in Kissinger's "Essays on American Foreign Policy." Henry the K describes three models for national decisionmaking: the "bureaucratic pragmatic," characterized by U.S. negotiators with legal backgrounds. Their everything is negotiable to maximize value for each side (non-zero-sum game). Next, the "bureaucratic ideological" is characterized by the Soviets, especially Stalinist; there is a core of dogma which is utterly non-negotiable; one cannot push a "bureaucratic ideologue" in certain areas, but one can also manipulate them based on knowledge of their dogma. Finally, and most relevant for this discussion, is the "charismatic nationalist,Kissinger's example of which is Sukarno. Such a leader, and the associated nation, must make wild charges and visibly defy Great Powers for domestic credibility -- such nations culturally need a "strong man." Much of the Middle East has this character. Kissinger suggests that shows of force may very well limit actions by such nations, and this is a role we must be prepared for as well as for global conflict. Battleships are wonderful for visual shows of force, but they do not have the flexibility of carrier groups. > > >Only in a conflict with a third-world nation, like Lebanon or Libya, can > >sea power have any effect. And these seem to be the conflicts we are having, often as proxies for Great Powers. > I do, however, agree somewhat with your thesis; large carriers are > perhaps best suited for peacetime navies; they're excellent for "gunboat ^^^^^^^^^ would you accept "limited war" rather than "peacetime?" > diplomacy." In the next shooting war, they may prove too vulnerable. But > you should understand that that's far from a proven point. > > >Aren't capital ships and carrier battle groups as obsolete as horse cavalry? > > > Second, horse cavalry is only obsolete because tanks completely aborbed > their role. Horse cavalry (really mounted infantry) may not be obsolete in specialized low-intensity situations -- horses can't charge massive fire, but may per perfectly useful for guerilla -- or QUIET counterguerilla -- operations. Helicopters and tanks may not be logistically feasible for all third-world countries' operations, and intelligent use of horses and mules, when they can survive, can be a force multiplier for troops otherwise ground-pounding. :-) Anyway, when a French cavalry officer was asked, in the 1930's, why the French retained major horse cavalry, he responded "But if we were to replace them with tractors, how would we grow mushrooms for the officers' mess on their exhaust?" > When remembering the Repulse and Renown, also remember Clark Field. When remembering the General Belgrano, also remember the Egyptian fields in the Six Days' War. Airfields, too, are vulnerable. > howard@cos.com OR {uunet, decuac, sun!sundc, hadron, hqda-ai}!cos!howard (703) 883-2812 [W] (703) 998-5017 [H] DISCLAIMER: Opinions expressed are not necessarily those of the Corporation for Open Systems, its members, or any standards body.