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From: willner%cfa183@harvard.harvard.edu (Steve Willner P-316 x57123)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Battleship History
Message-ID: <3282@cbnews.ATT.COM>
Date: 20 Jan 89 05:03:55 GMT
Sender: military@cbnews.ATT.COM
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Approved: military@att.att.com


> third, it  [sinking of Repulse and Prince of Wales] shattered any remaining
> doubts about the superiority of carriers over battleships (although the 
> latter point had been accepted by the major combattants, the US and Japan, 
> well before the war.)

Weren't the ships in question sunk by _land-based_ aircraft?  If so, 
the sinkings would not directly make the point you claim.

More seriously, neither US nor Japanese strategy early in the war reveals
any inkling that carriers were superior to battleships.  The US 
battleships were in Pearl Harbor because Kimmel and Halsey (Are these
the right names?) thought the BB's too valuable to risk scouting
for the Japanese fleet.  And Yamamoto's strategy at Midway was to
risk the carriers (the "Striking Force") while keeping the battleships 
(the "Main Force") relatively safe.  These strategic choices only make
sense if the battleships are considered the more valuable ships.