Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!husc6!uwvax!rutgers!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!osu-cis!att!cbnews!henry@zoo.toronto.edu
From: henry@zoo.toronto.edu
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: Are Aircraft Carriers Obsolete?
Message-ID: <3352@cbnews.ATT.COM>
Date: 23 Jan 89 02:26:33 GMT
Sender: military@cbnews.ATT.COM
Lines: 49
Approved: military@att.att.com

>>In a conflict against an industrialized nation, like Argentina, capital ships
>>must stay far away to avoid being hit by a Silkworm or an Exocet or even a
>>torpedo.
>
>So what happened to the Hermes?  It never got hit...

Yes, and partly this was because the British carriers stayed as far out
as possible, which greatly limited their effectiveness.  For example, it
was simply impossible to maintain a standing Sea Harrier patrol over San
Carlos Water, because endurance was too limited after the long flight in
from the carriers.  Similarly, there was no effective warning of raids,
because maintaining a radar picket vessel in a suitable location was
unacceptably risky.

>... Ask the Argentines about
>sea power.  They had LOTS of time to get ready - and they lost the
>Falklands.  

Au contraire.  They had practically no time to get ready, because they
did not expect Britain to go to war over the islands.  They would have
been much better prepared otherwise.  (For example, they had only a
handful of air-launched Exocets available, and France refused to supply
any more after the war started.)

Don't forget sheer incompetence, as well.  The Argentines never did figure
out that their bombs were not fuzed properly for low-altitude drops.  They
persisted in sending their aircraft in a few at a time, instead of in a
massed raid that would have made life much harder for the fleet.  They
panicked after the first Vulcan raid and withdrew all their air-combat
units to the mainland, giving control of the air to Britain and removing
the threat the Harrier pilots were most worried about:  a war of attrition
against a much larger force.  Even during the brief period of air combat,
their tactics were utterly inept.  (Comment by one of the Harrier pilots,
approximately:  "One learns not to do things like that on day one at a
competent weapons school.")  They completely failed to use their submarines
aggressively against the fleet.  (Actually, it's hard to class this as
incompetence, since it's a known problem affecting most sub forces:  their
peacetime training stresses stealth, but wartime effectiveness requires
boldness, since a sub cannot attack without revealing its presence.)
They made no attempt to attack the crucial base on Ascension Island.
They didn't mine Falkland Sound.

The Falklands War is an excellent example of the effectiveness of sea
power against an ineffective opponent.  It says little about what would
happen against prepared, competent opposition.  Indeed, given the non-
trivial losses that the fleet did take, what little it does say is ominous.

                                     Henry Spencer at U of Toronto Zoology
                                 uunet!attcan!utzoo!henry henry@zoo.toronto.edu