Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!lll-winken!lll-lcc!ames!xanth!ukma!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!osu-cis!att!cbnews!ugthomps@cs.buffalo.edu
From: ugthomps@cs.buffalo.edu
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: Are Aircraft Carriers Obsolete?
Message-ID: <3406@cbnews.ATT.COM>
Date: 24 Jan 89 02:50:59 GMT
References: <3353@cbnews.ATT.COM>
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In article <3353@cbnews.ATT.COM> henry@zoo.toronto.edu writes:
>>...A carrier will almost never be found without a large number
>>of escorting ships...  The
>>possibility of a submarine or a missile getting through these defenses
>>is quite limited.  Granted it CAN happen but the chances are not that
>>great.  Even if a missile did get through, the damage it would do to a
>>Nimitz class (for example) would not be very great. 

>One missile, yes (although one should not forget that the Sheffield was
>gutted by a fire started by a missile which failed to even explode).
>In a serious war against a prepared opponent, a carrier task force could
>expect missiles to come in mass salvos, not one or two at a time.
>The effectiveness of the defences against this sort of attack is much
>less clear.

As stated in a previous post, the damage caused to the Sheffield would
not very likely be so extensive on a US ship.  the Sheffield's compart-   
mentalization was limited at best, allowing for such a fire to spread
as rapidly as it did.

The large salvos you envision can indeed be brought to bear on
a task force centered on a carrier.  Whether missiles can get through
such defenses in such a task force in numbers large enough to incapacitate
a carrier or not is not a matter of hardware.  It is a matter or preparation.
If you have Interceptor craft out on the edges of the task force,
the chances are greatly reduced that the planes carrying the missiles
can get close enough.  If the ships on the edges of the force are aware
of imminent attack, a more coordinated defense can be brought to bear. 
Quick summary...the hardware to stop such an attack exists...
whether the task force is prepared or not would really determine the
outcome.  Russian planes have been known to do flybys on carriers 
without ever being detected prior to the flyby.   

>>... Phalanx CIWS system.  This system is capable of
>>firing 3000 depleted uranium rounds per minute.  It is entirely self automated.
>It's never been tested in its normal look-down orientation.  (All major
>tests that I'm aware of have put the Phalanx just above the water, a much
>more favorable situation.)  And the 3000/minute firing rate is a bit
>academic when the standard Phalanx only carries something like 20 seconds'
>worth of ammunition.  (I forget the exact number, but it's not large.)
>Even granted that it fires short bursts, it is not at all unrealistic to
>expect it to run out of ammunition quickly when faced with a mass raid.
>
I stand corrected (or modified? :-)) on this point.  Phalanx has indeed
never been tested in it's look down configuration.  Seeing that it was 
made to fire from horizontal to vertical, and not below horizontal, it
is debatable if the system would work on say a Harpoon type missile.

However, your data on the magazine of the Phalanx is incorrect, rather
I should say out of date.  I don't know if I am at liberty to say
so I won't.  If someone else knows, without having the clearance, 
then post it.  All things considered, though the phalanx can only take
out a max of 5-6 targets by itself, there are other defenses as well.
This happens to be only one.  And only one phalanx at that. 


>>In any war in which sea power has played a role, ships have been sunk. 
>>In the next war (god forbid), AEGIS equipped ships will go to the bottom
>>as well.  This is a fact of war.  One ships or several going to the
>>bottom will not change the fact that sea power is something that can
>>not be ignored...
>
>Sea power *can* be safely ignored if you can expect to sink much of it
>in the first few days of a war.  Current US shipbuilding policy basically
>assumes that relatively few ships will be lost, at least in the crucial
>categories (carriers, Aegis cruisers), because too few of them are built
>to allow for major attrition.  It is insane to be vitally dependent on
>a resource which you can count on your fingers.
>
Possibly.  You could be right, you could be wrong.  Attrition rates may
be alot lower than the experts suggest.  they could be higher.  Wartime
situations have a very big ? next to all of them.  Can you expect to
knock out the 3-4 carrier groups in the atlantic?  Can you knock out one
and have enough planes to launch another effective attack?  Can you
guarantee the air over the routes needed to be taken to reach the groups?
Can you guarantee surprise?  these are questions in favor of the US.
There are obviously others in favor of the USSR.  Even still, the fact
remains that you have reacted to the presence of that task force and
risked large amounts of hardware that could be used elsewhere to reduce
the threat posed.  You haven't ignored their presence.  Furthermore,
you can't even guarantee that your goal will be achieved. *can* you expect
to neutralise the Atlantic fleet in a few days???  Who knows.

                     - G