Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!iuvax!cogsci!dave From: dave@cogsci.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: Fun with the semantics of paradox Keywords: Types, Paradoxes Message-ID: <17220@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu> Date: 4 Feb 89 05:18:11 GMT References: <1883@buengc.BU.EDU> <2996@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu> <905@ubu.warwick.UUCP> <479@aipna.ed.ac.uk> <1036@hudson.acc.virginia.edu> <3715@uklirb.UUCP> <48717@yale-celray.yale.UUCP> <3781@uklirb.UUCP> <44268@linus.UUCP> Sender: root@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu Reply-To: dave@duckie.cogsci.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) Organization: Indiana University, Bloomington Lines: 28 In article <44268@linus.UUCP> bwk@mbunix.mitre.org (Barry Kort) writes: >In article <3781@uklirb.UUCP> kerber@uklirb.UUCP (Manfred Kerber) writes: > > > One gets S1 <==> NOT S1. It is a real paradox. > >The paradox goes away if you admit the possibility that S1 >is unprovable (or undecidable). Then we merely have >that S1 is unprovable if and only if NOT S1 is unprovable. > Sure, you've shown that S1 is unprovable. But the paradox is still there. It still seems that S1 can be neither true nor false. According to the views of most mathematicians, meaningful mathematical statements must have some truth-value, irrespective of whether or not they are provable. Even Godel's result never argued with this (his famous unprovable sentence G, say, was in fact true, although the proof had to be outside its particular system.) To abandon the notion that a meaningful mathematical statement must be either true or false leads one straight into the arms of the intuitionists. (Well, I guess there are a few of them about.) All the problems with S1 stem from the fact that it is not meaningful - it talks about nothing apart from it's own truth-value, so it is not grounded in reality. So any 'paradox' shouldn't worry us. Dave Chalmers P.S. Will people please shut up about the French royal family. This is really semantic games with absolutely no interesting conceptual problems behind it all.