Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!iuvax!cogsci!dave From: dave@cogsci.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: Natural Paradox Keywords: Counterexample, Evidence, Belief, Proof, Provability Message-ID: <17482@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu> Date: 11 Feb 89 05:55:27 GMT References: <1706@tank.uchicago.edu> <9526@ihlpb.ATT.COM> <44585@linus.UUCP> <9@UNIX386.Convergent.COM> Sender: root@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu Reply-To: dave@duckie.cogsci.indiana.edu (David Chalmers) Organization: Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University Lines: 41 In article <9@UNIX386.Convergent.COM> mark@UNIX386.Convergent.COM (Mark Nudelman) writes: >A "proof" is a sequence of symbolic >manipulations which starts with a set of axioms and ends with the >statement to be proven, following a certain set of rules for the >manipulations along the way. If a statement is "provable", it means >such a sequence exists; this sequence is the "proof" for the statement. >But what does it mean to prove that a statement is provable? If a >statement is provable, then by definition a proof exists; exhibiting >this proof would seem to prove that the statement is provable. Whether >or not any human being at any particular time in history is actually >aware of the proof is irrelevant; if the proof exists, then the statement >is provable; and exhibition of the proof is proof that it is provable. >For a statement to be "provable, but not provably provable" would seem to >mean that a proof exists, but cannot be exhibited. Thanks Mark. You're absolutely right. Funnily enough, this is exactly what I said 2 weeks ago in the posting which brought up the discussion of provability. As I said back then: if a statement is provable, it is provable that it's provable. All this discussion of Fermat's Last Theorem (and Rolle's Theorem, I ask you!) is missing the point completely. As you say: it is part of the very essence of a proof that it be a sequence of symbols. And obviously any sequence of symbols can be exhibited. (And just in case anyone gets any funny ideas: no, it couldn't be the case that we couldn't PROVE that this sequence of symbols was a proof - this is built into the defintion.) So given any proof, all we have to do is exhibit it and we've proven that we have a proof. (If you want to be totally rigorous, you can accompany the exhibition with a detailed demonstration that logical rules are being obeyed.) The only way the general principle of "provability implies provable provability" could fail to hold, is as you say if we had some system where a proof could 'exist' but be unable to be written down. Now this seems totally contradictory to the idea of 'proof' to me - but perhaps some people might be willing to entertain the idea. All I can say is that it wouldn't happen in normal mathematics. It would have to be in one of those "weird logics" that I mentioned in my first posting. Dave Chalmers