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From: creps@silver.bacs.indiana.edu (Steve Creps)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: Battleship History
Message-ID: <3449@cbnews.ATT.COM>
Date: 25 Jan 89 03:52:13 GMT
References: <3282@cbnews.ATT.COM>
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Organization: Indiana University Computer Science, Bloomington
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In article <3282@cbnews.ATT.COM: willner%cfa183@harvard.harvard.edu (Steve Willner P-316 x57123) writes:
[stuff deleted]
:More seriously, neither US nor Japanese strategy early in the war reveals
:any inkling that carriers were superior to battleships.

   Naval air power was in its infancy preceding World War II, but by the end
of the war had emerged as the most important ship. Of course early strategy
(before naval air power had been proven) would consider the battleship more
important, but this soon enough changed.
   At the time of the Pearl Harbor attack it probably was still an accepted
idea that battleships were superior to aircraft carriers, however this belief
changed as the war progressed, as Carrier Groups eventually replaced Battle-
ship Groups (because of the results of battles involving carriers), at least
in the U. S. Navy. The Battle of Midway was still a fairly early point of the
war (June 1942), but even by then carriers were gaining more and more accep-
tance as "the" important ship (Halsey's flagship was the Enterprise at this
time, I think). If carriers weren't considered as important as battleships
then (which I'm not saying), this was only because of the earliness of the war.

:The US 
:battleships were in Pearl Harbor because Kimmel and Halsey (Are these
					  ^^^^^^
   Do you mean Chester Nimitz?

:the right names?) thought the BB's too valuable to risk scouting
:for the Japanese fleet.

   I believe that the carriers (Enterprise and Hornet, I think) were out of
Pearl on maneuvers at the time. Remember, we were still at _peace_ in early
December 1941, and weren't thinking much about risking _any_ ships. (Granted,
we suspected something, but December 7 started out as any other Sunday in
Hawaii, and we were caught by surprise).

:And Yamamoto's strategy at Midway was to
:risk the carriers (the "Striking Force") while keeping the battleships
:(the "Main Force") relatively safe.  These strategic choices only make
:sense if the battleships are considered the more valuable ships.

   Or if he feared the loss of his battleships (including the Yamato) to
American carrier-based planes, and thought he had a better chance against
them with his own carriers. A battleship isn't too valuable if you can't
use it.

-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Steve Creps, Indiana University, Bloomington, home of the "Hoosiers"
	creps@silver.bacs.indiana.edu (129.79.1.6)
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