Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!ames!ucsd!rutgers!elbereth.rutgers.edu!harnad From: harnad@elbereth.rutgers.edu (Stevan Harnad) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: Question on Chinese Room Argument Summary: Elementary Primer On the "Other Minds" Problem Message-ID: Date: 19 Feb 89 19:23:35 GMT References: <4298@pt.cs.cmu.edu> <8174@netnews.upenn.edu> Organization: Rutgers Univ., New Brunswick, N.J. Lines: 60 steyn@eniac.seas.upenn.edu (Gavin Steyn) of University of Pennsylvania writes: " [1] I don't believe Searle has a mind... [2] everyone is " just a symbol processing box... can you prove me wrong? You're certainly entitled to say (1). That's just an instance of the familiar "other minds" problem: There's no way to know for sure that anyone else but oneself has a mind. On the other hand, [2] is just an obiter dictum, hand-waving, a bald claim (one that also happens to be believed by a lot of current AI investigators simply because they have not thought very deeply about any of this). I certainly can't "prove" you wrong about [1]. No one can (not even Searle, though he can of course chuckle privately over the fact that he knows perfectly well the "unprovable" truth that you are in fact wrong about him...). And even if you ask for less than mathematical "proof," i.e., only ordinary empirical evidence, no one can give you a shred of it -- and that's the other-minds problem too: All empirical "evidence" that Searle has a mind (e.g., he has a brain like yours, he looks like you, he talks like you, he acts like you -- EVEN that he has a symbol cruncher inside that's running the same program!) is JUST as compatible with the fact that he HAS a mind as with the fact that he has NO mind but merely looks, acts etc. just as if he didl So what? That's all just a restatement of the other-minds problem. The ONLY one who can know for sure that Searle has a mind is Searle himself. And the same is true of your mind: YOU know it (don't you? don't you?). But do you also "know" that you're a symbol-processor? Or that your having a mind is purely a consequence of your being a symbol-processor? If so, please share... No, [2] is a different kettle of fish. It's just a not very deeply examined notion that is currently in fashion and that Searle's argument (for those who have been prepared to think deeply enough about it to understand it) has gone some way toward showing to be incorrect. A more tenable version of [2] might be: [2'] everyone EXCEPT ME is just a symbol processing box but that version just wears its incompleteness and arbitrariness on its sleeve (which is why no one ever remembers to put it that way). Some readers know that in my writing I have advocated what I call the Total Turing Test (TTT) as a methodological constraint in cognitive modeling. I have also advocated methodological epiphenomenalism. However, I have never mistaken the TTT for a "proof" or even empirical evidence. It isn't. Nor have I had to resort to denying the obvious: That people have minds, just as I do. I have, however, taken up Searle's torch to show why a "symbol processing box" could not pass the TTT. It would be useful if those with a serious interest in these matters would slow down long enough to grasp the logic and the facts before hurtling on to their respective weighty conclusions... -- Stevan Harnad INTERNET: harnad@confidence.princeton.edu harnad@princeton.edu srh@flash.bellcore.com harnad@elbereth.rutgers.edu harnad@princeton.uucp BITNET: harnad@pucc.bitnet CSNET: harnad%princeton.edu@relay.cs.net (609)-921-7771