Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!cornell!rochester!yamauchi From: yamauchi@cs.rochester.edu (Brian Yamauchi) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: Question on Chinese Room Argument Message-ID: <1989Feb20.213329.10376@cs.rochester.edu> Date: 21 Feb 89 02:33:29 GMT References: <4298@pt.cs.cmu.edu> <4296@cs.Buffalo.EDU> Reply-To: yamauchi@cs.rochester.edu (Brian Yamauchi) Organization: U of Rochester, CS Dept, Rochester, NY Lines: 25 In article harnad@elbereth.rutgers.edu (Stevan Harnad) writes: >[Paradoxically, my own work suggests that even cognitive psychologists >should not worry too much about capturing understanding: I have given >reasons -- empirical, methodological and logical -- for adopting >"methodological epiphenomenalism" and the "Total Turing Test (robotic >version)" as constraints on cognitive modeling. However, these same >reasons also go strongly against symbolic modeling in favor of hybrid >modeling, grounding symbolic representations bottom-up in nonsymbolic >(analog and categorical) representations.] >Stevan Harnad INTERNET: harnad@confidence.princeton.edu harnad@princeton.edu I'm trying to figure out whether you and I are saying exactly the same thing, but using completely different languages. I'm saying that I agree with Hans Moravec and Rodney Brooks that in order to build intelligence, we will need to build complete robotic systems including both sensory input and motor control. Is this anything like "methodological epiphenomenalism"? _______________________________________________________________________________ Brian Yamauchi University of Rochester yamauchi@cs.rochester.edu Computer Science Department _______________________________________________________________________________