Path: utzoo!utgpu!utstat!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!iuvax!rutgers!elbereth.rutgers.edu!harnad From: harnad@elbereth.rutgers.edu (Stevan Harnad) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: Question on Chinese Room Argument Summary: On Grounded Robotics, And Being There Message-ID: Date: 21 Feb 89 04:59:49 GMT References: <4298@pt.cs.cmu.edu> <1989Feb20.213329.10376@cs.rochester.edu> Organization: Rutgers Univ., New Brunswick, N.J. Lines: 31 yamauchi@cs.rochester.edu (Brian Yamauchi) of U of Rochester, CS Dept, Rochester, NY wrote: " I agree with Hans Moravec and Rodney Brooks that in order to build " intelligence, we will need to build complete robotic systems including " both sensory input and motor control. Is this anything like " "methodological epiphenomenalism"? No, but it sounds like a step in the direction of the Total Turing Test (TTT) rather than just the linguistic TT. It also sounds like a step toward a grounded symbolic/nonsymbolic system, but it all depends on the grounding scheme. Just hooking up an autonomous symbol-cruncher module to autonomous transducer and effector modules won't do it; the functional dependency of the symbols on the nonsymbolic representations must be deeper and more intimate than that. ("Methodological Epiphenomenalism" is just a theoretical strategy that recognizes that subjective phenomena cannot have an independent causal role in a functional model and hence makes no direct attempt to "capture" subjective phenomenology, just total performance capacity (TTT), accepting that if mental processes are involved, they somehow piggy-back on the functions generating the TTT capacity, and that there is no way to confirm their presence directly except by BEING the robot in question.) -- Stevan Harnad INTERNET: harnad@confidence.princeton.edu harnad@princeton.edu srh@flash.bellcore.com harnad@elbereth.rutgers.edu harnad@princeton.uucp BITNET: harnad@pucc.bitnet CSNET: harnad%princeton.edu@relay.cs.net (609)-921-7771