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From: gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: letter to THE NEW YORK REVIEW concerning AI
Keywords: Intention
Message-ID: <2447@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk>
Date: 21 Feb 89 11:45:11 GMT
References: <7471@venera.isi.edu> <Feb.9.21.07.59.1989.2316@elbereth.rutgers.edu> <7507@venera.isi.edu> <Feb.15.00.46.48.1989.18756@elbereth.rutgers.edu> <4297@pt.cs.cmu.edu>
Reply-To: gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton)
Organization: Comp Sci, Glasgow Univ, Scotland
Lines: 22

In article <4297@pt.cs.cmu.edu> tsf@PROOF.ERGO.CS.CMU.EDU (Timothy Freeman) writes:
>The subjective sensation is, in itself, totally useless.  The behavior
>of the participating systems is what matters.

Absolute balls.

The subjective feeling of understanding is vital to much human action.
Action without understanding is regarded as reckless and subject to the full continuum
of moral disapprobation.

Timothy's  mypoic blurt is further evidence of the positivist drivel which infests
the underlying dogmas of AI research(ers).  Human behaviour is characterised by
agency and intention based on personal understanding of situations.  Such a characterisation
cannot be applied to programs.

And to Steven and his trench-footed collaborators, just remember what you find as
you dig a trench deeper, and what you can see when your in it.

Put your shovel away and sit out on the meadow awhile.
-- 
Gilbert Cockton, Department of Computing Science,  The University, Glasgow
	gilbert@uk.ac.glasgow.cs <europe>!ukc!glasgow!gilbert