Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!mcvax!ukc!strath-cs!glasgow!gilbert From: gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: letter to THE NEW YORK REVIEW concerning AI Keywords: Intention Message-ID: <2481@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk> Date: 28 Feb 89 11:40:54 GMT References: <7471@venera.isi.edu> <2447@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk> <509@mmlai.UUCP> Reply-To: gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) Organization: Comp Sci, Glasgow Univ, Scotland Lines: 69 In article <509@mmlai.UUCP> barash@mmlai.UUCP (Steve Barash) writes: >Does this mean you are measuring the importance of subjective feeling by >its effect of observable action? If so, Tim's point holds. If not, how >are you measuring its importance? I am 'measuring' the importance of subjective feeling by the importance to which individuals attribute to it in explaining their behaviour. I have coached gymnastics and used to compete. I know how to stand-in (or 'spot' for some Americans) for a wide-number of moves. I attempt to teach how to stand in to a novice coach. I take her/him through the principles and set up their rule-base in the process :-) I demonstrate the principles with young gymnasts. I ask the novice coach to stand in. He/she says that he/she doesn't understand. I ask her/him to talk me through standing-in for the move. She/he parrots out the rule-base verbatim. Their knowledge-base is perfect. But they say they don't understand, and don't want to stand in. What observable actions are there here? An utterance - "I do not understand", a recital ("To stand in for a back somersault from a round off, stand on the side to which the gynmnast turns in the round off, slightly forward of where they will place their hands, ..." etc. etc) and a refusal (perhaps implicit in the utterance). Contrast another scenario .. The utterance - "I do understand, but I'm unsure, I don't want to get it wrong. I know that (recital ("To stand in for a back somersault from a round off, stand on the side to which the gynmnast turns in the round off, slightly forward of where they will place their hands, ..." etc. etc)) and a refusal (implicit in the utterance). In both cases the obervable actions are the same, a refusal to do something. But the causes are different, and cannot be observed. We have to believe the people involved or convince them otherwise. Do you count speech as an obervable action? Can we tell someone that they do understand when they don't? Can we tell someone that they should be confident when they are not? Subjective states here can be 'observed' (by a blind person at that) to influence people's behaviour. Knowledge of a rule-base is not a necessary condition for action. Anyone who believes otherwise is trapped in some illusion forced on them by their adherance to strong AI. I'd love to video a day in the life of a strong AI guru to show them how agency, intention and understanding are vital to the way they live their lives. Let's stick to the gymnastics example. Would any advocate of strong AI with children or grandchildren agree to take classroom instruction on standing in for somersaults, and when paper-based tests showed that their knowledge-base was a perfect replica of mine (how do we show that though :-)), they would then go and stand-in while their (grand)child attempted somersaults? Why not (I accept dropping out because of lack of strength or reaction times, but then we could train these up)? Humans have the good sense to refuse to act when they realise that their understanding is inadequate. This lack of understanding cannot be measured by any paper-based psychometric test. It is not a question of what one can regurgitate. That little old homunculus is right in there saying "no way Jose"! The problem with AI-based systems is the lack of any facility for determining when they do not understand something. When they do not "know" is a different issue. The upshot is that a responsible AI-based system is impossible. Responsibility must lie with the programmers. How many AI programmers would take responsibility for anything they programmed? -- Gilbert Cockton, Department of Computing Science, The University, Glasgow gilbert@uk.ac.glasgow.cs !ukc!glasgow!gilbert