Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!lll-winken!ncis.llnl.gov!helios.ee.lbl.gov!nosc!humu!uhccux!lee From: lee@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu (Greg Lee) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: Question on Chinese Room Argument Message-ID: <3351@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu> Date: 1 Mar 89 15:53:51 GMT References: Organization: University of Hawaii Lines: 116 From article , by harnad@elbereth.rutgers.edu (Stevan Harnad): " " lee@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu (Greg Lee) of University of Hawaii wrote: " "" No, there aren't "two senses of "understand," a subjective and an "" objective one," [otherwise we couldn't say] 'He understands, and I do too' This is, I take it, a tangential point. I had said that Searle's argument showed no essential difference between computers and people and turned on a mere point of usage of the term 'understanding'. Then I went on to say that *even* the point about usage was not very well taken, as one can see easily enough once one recognizes the terminological nature of the argument. Now it's this secondary question of usage that is being discussed, as far as I can make out. Harnad says there's a "true" sense of 'understand' with respect to which we should agree with Searle's terminological argument. Maybe so. I don't think so, but even if I'm wrong, and Searle has done some first rate linguistics here, the main point seems to have been established. There is no substance to the Chinese Room argument -- it's just toying with words. " As I've suggested already, this is simply not a linguistic matter. I noticed that suggestion. But then you keep citing (purported) facts about language usage and giving linguistic analyses to support your views. At least, if the analyses you give are intended to have any empirical content, I don't see how else they can be construed. When you propose this distinction of yours between understanding(subjective) and understanding(objective), how are we to take this? Are you making a definition for convenience of discussion? If so, fine. You can make any definitions you want. Or maybe you're declaring that as a matter of personal taste, you like to make this distinction. Well, to each his own. The trouble is, you seem to think you're doing more -- that there really *is* a distinction of the sort you claim, and that it's a matter to which some sort of factual evidence is relevant. And the only evidence you offer concerns language usage, so when you say it's "simply not a linguistic matter", how can we believe you? You're simply wrong. As you have put the issue so far, it *is* a linguistic matter. If the existence of this distinction you claim is not intended to be an empirical proposal, then it's time for you to say so. In that event, I will have no further interest, personally. If it is intended to be empirical, and facts other than those of language usage can be found to suppport it, then it's time for you to say what those facts are. Until then, I guess we'll continue to talk linguistics. " The distinction I'm after is already there with "pain" (although we don't " have two senses of pain as we do of understanding -- the reason for " this will become clearer as we go on). Consider "I'm in pain and he is " too." Apart from the obvious fact that I don't mean he's in MY pain " (which is already a difference, and not a "linguistic" one but an " experiential and conceptual one), I'll comment on the parenthetical. There are several interesting things about this construction, but they are susceptible to linguistic analysis, and they have nothing to do with 'pain' being "experiential". In 'He is in (his) pain', the "his" part is understood, but cannot be made explicit. Similarly, 'He is red in the (his) face'. Is it because pain and faces are subjective? Nope. It has to do with inalienable possession. A face is linguistically an intrinsic inseparable part of a person (for English). Many languages of the world make a distinction between alienable and inalienable possession. It turns up in different forms. It's complicated. It's linguistic. Another interesting thing about your example is the sloppy identity between the 'in (my) pain' antecedent and the elided 'in (his) pain'. The phenomenon has received lots of discussion since Haj Ross talked about it in his 1967 dissertation. Compare 'Mary said that she'd like to have her steak rare, and John did, too' -- which has as one possible interpretation '... John said he'd like to have his steak rare, too'. Let's see -- is this because steaks, or saying or liking are inherently subjective phenomena? Nope. Missed the boat again. It's a question of syntactic scope. " it makes sense to say "He SEEMS to be " in pain (but may not really be in pain)," but surely not that "I SEEM " to be in pain (but may not really be in pain)." On the contrary. 'I seem to be in pain' is a perfectly ordinary thing to say. 'Hey, Doc, I've been taking these pills for weeks now, and I still seem to be in pain.' But maybe you disagree with this. If so, can we take a survey to settle the matter? Or, if most people agree with me, will you say "Oh, you're just not using 'seem' *properly*." Or maybe we'll have a distinction between seem(subjective) and seem(objective). " (Please don't reply " about tissue damage, ... Wouldn't think of it. " ... "" Pardon me if I implied that only philosophers do second-rate linguistics. " " I won't make the obvious repartee, but will just repeat that these are not " linguistic matters... I shouldn't have been snide. I'm sure you could do some very good linguistics IF YOU KNEW YOU WERE DOING IT. Offering facts of language and linguistic analyses without understanding that you're actually doing linguistics is a big handicap. " [In a later posting Lee mixes up the syntax " of the (putative) symbolic "language of thought" -- whose existence and " nature is what is at issue here -- and the syntax of natural languages: " Not the same issue, Greg.] I haven't the foggiest idea of what mixing up you are referring to. I'm reasonably sure I never said anything about a "language of thought". What are you talking about? Greg, lee@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu