Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!nrl-cmf!ukma!gatech!rutgers!att!ihlpb!arm From: arm@ihlpb.ATT.COM (Macalalad) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: Question on Chinese Room Argument Keywords: Understanding, Comprehension, Learning Message-ID: <9770@ihlpb.ATT.COM> Date: 2 Mar 89 21:53:51 GMT References: <4298@pt.cs.cmu.edu> <7220@polya.Stanford.EDU> Reply-To: arm@ihlpb.UUCP (55528-Macalalad,A.R.) Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories - Naperville, Illinois Lines: 84 In article harnad@elbereth.rutgers.edu (Stevan Harnad) writes: >There are two senses in which Searle is advocating "looking inside": One >is to look at the functions of the brain, because we have pretty good >reason to believe that candidates with brains have minds (because, as I >would put it, candidates with brains can pass the TTT). The second sense >of "inside" is the first-person test for subjectivity, which we can all >perform on ourselves. It's THAT "causal power" that he reminds us >brains have but symbol-crunchers do not. My reply is that candidates >OTHER than the brain that can pass the TTT (if and when we come up with >any) are immune to his Chinese Room Argument that they cannot have a >mind (though, of course, I repeat, no objective test can demonstrate >that anyone, EVEN ourselves, has a mind). Searle's argument against >(hypothetical) candidates that pass the LTT only, with symbols only, >is decisive, however. AHA! We finally have a definition from Stevan about understanding, or at least a prerequisite to understanding, namely, the ability to introspect. In light of this prerequisite, let me see if I understand Searle's argument: (1) In order to understand, a system must be able to introspect. (Sort of like "I think, therefore I am.") (2) A given entity is the best judge of what it can or cannot understand, given that the entity is capable of introspection. (3) From (1), in order for the Chinese room to understand, there must be an introspecting agent. (4) The human in the Chinese room is clearly capable of introspection. (If not, substitute yourself for the human in the Chinese room.) (5) From (3) and (4), the human is the introspecting agent in the formal system, if indeed the formal system has one. (6) From (2) and (5), the human is the best judge of what the system can or cannot understand. (7) The human, upon introspection, concludes that he or she does not understand Chinese. (8) From (6) and (7), the system does not understand Chinese, although it appears to outside observers that it can. Do I fairly characterize Searle's argument? If so, I think that (5) is clearly the weak point in the chain. And although I've seen Stevan staunchly defend some of the other points, which I personally don't have serious problems with, I haven't really seen him address this point, other than to argue that it is obvious to everyone who hasn't been brainwashed by a Yale education. Being a Yalie myself, I wonder if Stevan would run through the argument a bit slower for my benefit. The systems reply focuses on the weakness of (5), stating that the introspective agent is not the human, but the formal system. If we then say that the formal system is incapable of introspection, then why are we going through the exercise of Searle's argument? Aren't we assuming that the formal system is incapable of understanding in order to prove that it's incapable of understanding? Isn't the hidden premise of (5) really that if the formal system is capable of introspection, then the agent of introspection must necessarily be the agent which executes the rules? To that hidden premise comes the argument that neurons are the agents of the brain which execute our "rules" of understanding, yet they certainly don't seem to be introspective. So unless Stevan can show me otherwise, I can't see how Searle's argument is logically compelling. It isn't even intuitively compelling to me, but then again, I'm in the grips of an ideology, and a Yalie on top of that. :-) >I've always thought this reasoning was quite easy to understand, but from >the fact that very few people have given me any objective evidence that >they've understood it, I've concluded that it must be difficult to >understand. Maybe by trying to put it slightly differently each time, >tailoring it to the latest misunderstanding, I'll succeed in making it >understood eventually... I'm getting optimistic here, Stevan. I do believe we're making some progress. Maybe a few more iterations before we reach an agreement? Nah. -Alex