Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!cornell!rochester!rutgers!cmcl2!yale!dvm
From: dvm@yale.UUCP (Drew Mcdermott)
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Chinese room
Keywords: understanding,Searle
Message-ID: <53207@yale-celray.yale.UUCP>
Date: 9 Mar 89 17:11:19 GMT
Organization: Yale University, New Haven, CT
Lines: 55

I want to weigh into the Chinese-room discussion on the side of Engelson,
Geddis, et al., and opposite Harnad.

I think Engelson et al. have put the case pretty clearly that Searle+rules
may well be a different entity than Searle by himself.  As I said in
my original response to Searle, if all N employees of a corporation stand
in a room, then the room contains N+1 legal persons.  If Searle+rules is
a person, then wherever Searle goes two persons go.  It's true that this
is a piece of dogma; I don't know of any compelling argument in favor of
it.  On the other hand, I don't know of any compelling argument against it.
Searle's argument is basically to state the consequences of the "strong AI"
theory and invite one to find them absurd.  One need not.  It's a draw.

The whole argument is reminiscent of Ned Block's argument about qualia.
(In "Troubles about Functionalism.")  His argument was: If functionalism
is true, then we could get China to be conscious by having all the Chinese
simulate information processors in the right way.  This is absurd, so
functionalism (and hence stronger positions, like strong AI) are false.
But this argument, like Searle's, is just a clash of intuitions.  If
you can imagine that China is conscious, the argument fails.  I can,
I think.  (I wonder who the Chinese use for their examples?)

I've already lost Harnad, but others may find the following more specific
remarks illuminating.  As Engelson (I believe) said, if subjective
experience is the hallmark of understanding, then the question is whether
Searle+rules has the right kind of subjective experience.  (As an aside,
I believe there is such a subjective experience, but it's not clear it's
the hallmark of anything except a decision to stop thinking about something.)
It seems to me there are four positions one could take:

  1 Yes, obviously Searle+rules is the sort of entity that could have
    this experience.  [I hope it's obvious that the rules I and the
    others are envisioning do a good deal more than the Schankian
    script appliers Searle was describing.  I will grant that those
    rules wouldn't have any experiences.]

  2 No, obviously nothing of that sort could ever have the experience

  3 Perhaps they could, but only the system itself could ever know, and
    we probably can't trust what it says.  Having it type out "I'm getting 
    that warm glow of comprehension" might not tell us much.
    
  4 It's an empirical question whether a given system of this sort has
    experiences, and we won't know until we have more information about
    what experience is at the physiological or computational level.
    (Or even what level is appropriate.)

It seems to me that the safest position is number 4, but I am in the grip
of an ideology, so I lean toward number 1.  Anyone who likes position 2
is also in the grip of an ideology, though.  I would bet that position 3
is attractive to most people, but it seems intrinsically dualist to me,
so I am puzzled by people who like (3) but claim not to be dualists.  I
can't decide whether Harnad's MTE or MPE positions correspond to 2, 3, or 4.
Perhaps MTE=4 and MPE=3. 
                                        -- Drew McDermott