Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!purdue!decwrl!sun!pitstop!sundc!seismo!uunet!mcvax!ukc!strath-cs!glasgow!gilbert From: gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: Re: Eliza and the Question on Chinese Room Argument Message-ID: <2574@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk> Date: 13 Mar 89 10:39:25 GMT References: <4395@pt.cs.cmu.edu> <280003@hplchm.HP.COM> Reply-To: gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) Organization: Comp Sci, Glasgow Univ, Scotland Lines: 20 In article <280003@hplchm.HP.COM> curry@hplchm.HP.COM (Bo Curry) writes: > Admit that this intuition may be mistaken, and Searle's > (and Harnad's) argument disappears. Why should I? Admit that gravity may not exist, and then what disappears? I think you should argue your case. If people's "intuitions" say the room/rules have no understanding, then why doubt them? What's the gain? If your AI systems "work", all well and good. But don't demand that people call black white in the process. If AI folk spent less time trying to redefine everyday language, people might trust them more. There is no quicker way to lose people's trust than to abuse language. -- Gilbert Cockton, Department of Computing Science, The University, Glasgow gilbert@uk.ac.glasgow.cs !ukc!glasgow!gilbert