Path: utzoo!utgpu!utstat!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!ames!xanth!mcnc!rti!xyzzy!agarn!throopw From: throopw@agarn.dg.com (Wayne A. Throop) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: Re: Eliza and the Question on Chinese Room Argument Message-ID: <4278@xyzzy.UUCP> Date: 20 Mar 89 19:10:14 GMT References: <4395@pt.cs.cmu.edu> <280003@hplchm.HP.COM> <2574@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk> Sender: usenet@xyzzy.UUCP Lines: 29 > gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) > If people's "intuitions" say the room/rules have no understanding, > then why doubt them? What's the gain? Well... many "people's intuitions" say that Eliza already understands. Why doubt *them*? The gain in doubting people that think Eliza understands is that we don't cheapen what we mean by "understanding". The gain in doubting that people that think the CR shows that the room/rules have no understanding even in principle is that we don't arbitrarily anthopomorphize what we will accept as an "understanding entity". > If your AI systems "work", all well and good. But don't demand that > people call black white in the process. If AI folk spent less time > trying to redefine everyday language, people might trust them more. This situation doesn't arise in the CR. In fact, the CR's premise is that "people's intuition" from outside the room leads them to think the room understands, and "people's intuition" once they've seen inside the room leads them to think otherwise. So, we aren't asking to call black white. We are asking whether black should be defined functionally (in terms of the light it reflects) or structurally (in terms of which pigments it is constructed of). -- "Who would be fighting with the weather like this?" "Only a lunatic." "So you think D'Artagnian is involved?" --- Porthos, Athos, and Aramis. -- Wayne Throop !mcnc!rti!xyzzy!throopw