Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!ucbvax!agate!helios.ee.lbl.gov!ucsd!ames!lll-winken!uunet!mcvax!ukc!strath-cs!glasgow!gilbert From: gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) Newsgroups: comp.ai Subject: ReProgrammed Cockton Message-ID: <2702@crete.cs.glasgow.ac.uk> Date: 30 Mar 89 09:28:05 GMT References: <1127@novavax.UUCP> <20900003@bradley> <1138@novavax.UUCP> Reply-To: gilbert@cs.glasgow.ac.uk (Gilbert Cockton) Organization: Comp Sci, Glasgow Univ, Scotland Lines: 50 In article <1138@novavax.UUCP> maddoxt@novavax.UUCP (Thomas Maddox) writes: > Cockton never discusses AI here, so what difference does it >make what topic he raves upon? Out of the mouths of babes ... Actually, there is a serious point in there, so I presume some neutron storm passed through the poster's mind at the time of composition :-)) Many AI workers complain that the arguments against AI rarely refer to the work of AI. Critics of AI are not reknowned for their copious references to AI sources. I attended a master's course on IKBS as part of my postgraduate research, so I could cite references. The point is that it's unnecessary. Doubtless, our white-heat technophiles reading this group poo-poo astrology (so do I). If astrology deserves the same well-researched criticism that AI demands, then arguments against astrology which do not cite the predictions of the world's greatest (and I can see your marvellous jumpers right now Russel Grant), including the complete works of every Gipsey Rose Lee, are obviously not well-founded. Following the intellectual etiquette of AI, critiques must cite a random collection of key papers as listed by the sages. A proper critique of AI must cite X, Y, and Z, and understand all of them in the context of the folk knowledge that has passed down with presentation, re-presentation and indirect homage. Thus an acceptable critique of astrology must cite any works considered germane by astrologers? On the contrary, sound arguments against the validity of astrology can be constructed on epistemelogical grounds alone. The same is true of AI. The question is, can computers be programmed to be valid models of some woolly construct called 'Mind' (what the hell is mind?)? This question can be addressed competently without reference to any program constructed within the last 30 years of AI. The answers depend wholly on epistemic stances, some more flawed than others. Indeed, even the respectable work in AI (ACT*, SOAR etc.), is dependent on unfounded assumptions about the significance of isolated and unconnected laboratory experiments involving silly words, pings and dots on displays. The complaint that philosophy is irrelevant, and time will tell in the advance of AI, is no more convincing for AI than astrology. It is not for humanity to learn of AI, but for AI to learn of humanity. This unfortunately includes all that turgid Euro-rubbish which Maddox tries to lampoon. After all, it's as much his intellectual heritage as mine. -- Gilbert Cockton, Department of Computing Science, The University, Glasgow gilbert@uk.ac.glasgow.cs !ukc!glasgow!gilbert