Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!bloom-beacon!bu-cs!kwe From: kwe@bu-cs.BU.EDU (kwe@bu-it.bu.edu (Kent W. England)) Newsgroups: comp.protocols.tcp-ip Subject: Re: IP based authentication of hosts Message-ID: <29455@bu-cs.BU.EDU> Date: 11 Apr 89 17:05:02 GMT References: <376@ists.ists.ca> <29416@bu-cs.BU.EDU> Reply-To: kwe@buit13.bu.edu (Kent England) Followup-To: comp.protocols.tcp-ip Organization: Boston U. Information Technology Lines: 27 In article hedrick@geneva.rutgers.edu (Charles Hedrick) writes: >Yes, with source routing you can fake IP addresses in such a way that >you get a two-way conversation going to the wrong place. > [...] > However in the end we're probably going to want >encryption-based validation for everything. I think even with kludges >in the gateways, the days are numbered for security based on source >addresses. I agree that encryption-based validation is important, but we still want to be sure that the unencrypted data follows specific (in some sense secure) routes. I think TOS is the way to do this, but until then I can structure my subnets in such a way that, with some physical security, I have some assurance that unencrypted, sensitive data cannot easily be snooped off the net. I would not want to allow someone with genuine Kerberos-authenticated access to login from an "open" subnet. I would want some assurance that the data stream is following routes controlled by the routers and not by the hosts. (Another argument against source routing :-) Is this reasonable? Kent England, BU