Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!ames!pasteur!ucbvax!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!osu-cis!att!cbnews!smb@ulysses.homer.nj.att.com
From: smb@ulysses.homer.nj.att.com (Steven M. Bellovin)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: Trident II failure
Keywords: misinformation?
Message-ID: <5642@cbnews.ATT.COM>
Date: 14 Apr 89 01:12:19 GMT
References: <5541@cbnews.ATT.COM>
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From: smb@ulysses.homer.nj.att.com (Steven M. Bellovin)


In article <5541@cbnews.ATT.COM>, bash@ihlpb.ATT.COM (Basham) writes:
> Assuming, however, all three failures have been actual, unplanned
> failures, 3 out of 20 misfires isn't all that great.  Maybe the
> bugs causing each failure have been found and corrected, but if not...

Actually, one of the failures in the pad launches wasn't a failure at
all.  More properly, there was no technical failure; there was just
a human communications failure.

To test the ability of the guidance system to recover, the missle was
deliberately programmed to go off-course a bit.  Ideally, it would have
returned to the proper course fairly promptly.  No one told this to the
range safety officer, though; when he saw the missle veering off-course,
he pressed the destruct button....  It's officially been ruled a non-test,
not a failure.