Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!lll-winken!ames!ig!bionet!agate!ucbvax!cs.rpi.edu!nl-kr-request From: nl-kr-request@cs.rpi.edu (NL-KR Moderator Chris Welty) Newsgroups: comp.ai.nlang-know-rep Subject: NL-KR Digest, Volume 6 No. 20 Message-ID: <8904161334.AA03918@fs3.cs.rpi.edu> Date: 16 Apr 89 13:34:23 GMT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Reply-To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu (NL-KR Digest) Organization: The Internet Lines: 606 Approved: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu NL-KR Digest (Sat Apr 15 16:45:18 1989) Volume 6 No. 20 Today's Topics: Philosophy/Cog Sci Colloquium SUNY Buffalo Cog Sci--Eric Dietrich CSLI Calendar, April 13, 4:22 AI and Law Conference - Program Announcement Submissions: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Requests, policy: nl-kr-request@cs.rpi.edu Back issues are available from host archive.cs.rpi.edu [128.213.1.10] in the files nl-kr/Vxx/Nyy (ie nl-kr/V01/N01 for V1#1), mail requests will not be promptly satisfied. If you can't reach `cs.rpi.edu' you may want to use `turing.cs.rpi.edu' instead. --------------------------------------------------------- To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Date: Fri, 7 Apr 89 11:50:55 EDT >From: rapaport@cs.Buffalo.EDU (William J. Rapaport) Subject: Philosophy/Cog Sci Colloquium UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY and GRADUATE RESEARCH INITIATIVE IN COGNITIVE AND LINGUISTIC SCIENCES PRESENT LYNNE RUDDER BAKER Department of Philosophy Middlebury College HAS REPRESENTATION BEEN NATURALIZED? Physicalism either denies or denigrates beliefs, by maintaining either that there are no beliefs or that beliefs are identical with physical states. Baker's book gives close examination of each of these proposals in turn, concluding that they come up short. One of the most subtle and influential proponents of physicalism is Jerry Fodor. At the American Philosophical Association meetings in December 1988, Baker read a cri- tique of Fodor's book _Psychosemantics_, with Fodor giving a reply. The paper she will read here is a revision of her APA paper that takes Fodor's reply into account. Wednesday, April 19, 1989 3:00 P.M. 684 Baldy Hall, Amherst Campus Contact Newton Garver, Dept. of Philosophy, 716-636-2444, or Bill Rapaport, Dept. of Computer Science, 716-636-3193, for further information. ------------------------------ To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Date: Mon, 10 Apr 89 15:23:36 EDT >From: rapaport@cs.Buffalo.EDU (William J. Rapaport) Subject: SUNY Buffalo Cog Sci--Eric Dietrich UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK GRADUATE RESEARCH INITIATIVE IN COGNITIVE AND LINGUISTIC SCIENCES PRESENTS ERIC DIETRICH Program in Philosophy and Computer & Systems Science Department of Philosophy SUNY Binghamton FODOR'S PERVERSE FRAME PROBLEM AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SCIENTIFIC A.I. Over the last several years, Jerry Fodor has developed a theory of mind which has the unintuitive consequence that one part of the human brain routinely solves an intractable (or undecidable) problem. This problem is Fodor's version of the frame problem, which was first discovered in 1969 by McCarthy and Hayes, and is currently the subject of controversy and debate. I will briefly discuss Fodor's theory of mind--the modular- ity thesis--and his version of the frame problem. Then I will show that Fodor's frame problem is not solvable by any physical computer with realistic resources. Though Fodor apparently embraces this conclusion, I do not. Instead, the modularity thesis should be rejected. The gap left by the modularity thesis, however, poses at least one serious prob- lem for AI. I will suggest one way of handling this problem and its implications for a scientific AI. Monday, April 17, 1989 4:00 P.M. 684 Baldy Hall, Amherst Campus There will be an evening discussion at 8:00 P.M. at David Mark's house, 380 S. Ellicott Creek Road, Amherst. Contact Bill Rapaport, Dept. of Computer Science, 716-636-3193, for further information. ------------------------------ To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Date: Wed, 12 Apr 89 17:56:37 PDT >From: emma@csli.Stanford.EDU (Emma Pease) Subject: CSLI Calendar, April 13, 4:22 C S L I C A L E N D A R O F P U B L I C E V E N T S _____________________________________________________________________________ 13 April 1989 Stanford Vol. 4, No. 22 _____________________________________________________________________________ A weekly publication of The Center for the Study of Language and Information, Ventura Hall, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 ____________ CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR THIS THURSDAY, 13 April 1989 2:15 p.m. CSLI Seminar Cordura Hall Varieties of Context: Session 2 Conference Room Reading: "Cognitive Significance and New Theories of Reference" John Perry, Philosophy, Stanford Respondent: Jim Greeno 3:30 p.m. Tea Ventura Hall 4:00 p.m. STASS Seminar Cordura Hall The Frog, the Fly, and the Coffee Cup: Part 2 Conference Room John Perry and David Israel (john@russell.stanford.edu and israel@ai.sri.com) Abstract below ____________ CSLI ACTIVITIES FOR NEXT THURSDAY, 20 April 1989 2:15 p.m. CSLI Seminar Cordura Hall Varieties of Context: Session 3 Conference Room Indexicality in Context Geoffrey Nunberg, Xerox PARC Respondent: Brian Smith 3:30 p.m. Tea Ventura Hall 4:00 p.m. STASS Seminar Cordura Hall Dewey on Defeasible Reasoning Conference Room Tom Burke (burke@csli.stanford.edu) Abstract below ____________ CSLI SPRING SEMINAR SERIES Varieties of Context led by Jim Greeno, Brian Smith, Susan Stucky (greeno.pa@xerox.com, briansmith.pa@xerox.com, stucky.pa@xerox.com) 2:15, Thursdays Everyone knows that `I' can be used to refer to different people depending on circumstance. So why is such a fuss being made of this fact? We think there are two reasons. First, rather than view contextual dependence as a peripheral or complicating incident, recent theories of language have started to treat it as central and enabling---as a core phenomenon. Second, contextual dependence has been cited in other semantical fields, too: logic, psychology, computation, etc. In this seminar, we'll look at context in a wide range of examples---drawn from syntax, Tarskian satisfaction, the Mac interface, natural-language discourse, programming-language semantics, even mechanics. We'll try to understand what's in common among such cases, and also see how they differ. The real question is whether context-dependence is sufficiently cohesive to justify the single rallying cry? We've divided up the subject matter, varieties of context, according to local talent and interest, with the idea that there would be short presentations (say, thirty minutes) followed by a reply and general discussion. This is the last general message about the CSLI Seminar on context you will be receiving. If you'd like to be on the mailing list and you weren't at the first meeting, please send your net address to stucky.pa@xerox.com, and you'll be added. Notices will still appear in the CSLI Calendar. ____________ THIS WEEK'S STASS SEMINAR The Frog, the Fly, and the Coffee Cup: Part 2 John Perry and David Israel (john@russell.stanford.edu and israel@ai.sri.com) Thursday, April 13, 4:00 In this session we will continue to discuss some basic concepts, problems, and ideas concerning the incrementality of information. We are convinced that the key to this lies in two principles: The relativity of (useful) concepts of linguistic and informational content has its roots in the structure of action. The useful, interesting, familiar, deep relations among contents come at the incremental level. ____________ NEXT WEEK'S STASS SEMINAR Dewey on Defeasible Reasoning Tom Burke (burke@csli.stanford.edu) Thursday, April 20, 4:00 This will be a report on my study of John Dewey's "Logic: The Theory of Inquiry" (1938). This book is relevant to STASS for historical reasons since a notion of `situation' plays a central role in Dewey's logical theory. Dewey's logic has been ignored for the past forty years, largely because (a) it isn't compatible with the philosophical underpinnings of `formal logic' as we now think of it (Fregean, Quinean, syntactic, etc.), and (b) no one seems to know what to make of it otherwise. I want to take a few steps in the direction of showing that Dewey's logical theory is technically sound and worth further development. Consider the following example of common, everyday `defeasible reasoning': (1) That thing is apple-shaped and is predominantly reddish; so (2) That thing is an apple. Everyone would agree that this is not an example of `deduction'. But what is it an example of? Dewey would suggest that proposition (1) concerns the present registration of certain `qualities' of some thing while (2) goes further to classify that thing as being of a `kind'. For Dewey there are two different sorts of predicates involved here whereas current logical theory sees only one. The problem, as Dewey sees it, is not the classical epistemological matter of figuring out how to get in some principled way from propositions about appearances to propositions about facts, but rather from propositions about qualities to propositions about kinds. The focus of my presentation will be to explain this distinction between qualities and kinds---a distinction yielding two different sorts of properties and relations (hence two basic sorts of `infons', in STASS jargon, and so two sorts of prepositions). I will then look briefly at inference in a Deweyan framework. I will show how Dewey can account for simple deductions without having to explicitly specify `rules of inference' based on syntactic features of linguistic expressions. Rather, such rules essentially supervene on how one treats particular determiners like `all', `some', `many', `few', etc. ____________ SYMBOLIC SYSTEMS FORUM Indexicality in Context Geoff Nunberg (nunberg.pa@xerox.com) Xerox PARC and Stanford Linguistics Friday, 21 April, 3:15, 60:62N Most of our semantic accounts of indexical expressions---words like `I' and `now', for example---have been developed primarily on the basis of observations about how they are used in one-on-one, face-to-face conversation. But there are some essential aspects of indexicality that only emerge when we widen the net to consider how they are used in other types of communicative contexts, like road signs, published books, or telephone answering machines. In this talk, I'm going to draw on examples like these to show that it's not just the reference of an indexical expression that varies from one occasion of use to another, but the meaning of the expression as well---that is, the type of relation that the referent bears to the utterance. (So, to take a simple example, a written token of `I' on a printed greeting-card verse refers to the sender, not the person who inscribed it or composed it; but a token of `I' in a forwarded mail message refers to the original composer.) I'll talk about how the meaning of a particular use of an indexical is determined by the circumstances of communication---the mode of production, transmission, presentation, and so forth---and why you have to allow a role to intentions in determining the meaning in these cases. Finally, I'll say something about how observations like these are relevant to certain questions that literary theorists have asked about the nature of the context (and in particular, the notion of `audience') that is relevant to textual interpretation. ____________ SITUATION THEORY AND ITS APPLICATIONS The first conference on Situation Theory and its Applications (ST&A) was held at Asilomar from March 23 to 26. Fifty-five people attended from England, Scotland, Germany, Sweden, Norway, Japan, and Korea, as well as from the U.S. The format of the conference consisted of sixteen refereed papers, chosen from thirty-three submitted papers. Presentations of an hour's length took place in the mornings and evenings, with the afternoons free for less formal activities. The papers were on topics ranging from situation theory itself, to applications in linguistics, computational linguistics, theories of inference, and prototype theory, for example. The meeting was considered a great success by all. It became clear that a body of shared intuitions, theory, and notation has developed over the past few years, and that situation theory now has a momentum of its own. The program committee (Robin Cooper, Jens-Erik Fenstad, Kuniaki Mukai, John Perry) plans to publish a book based on the proceedings of the meeting. The meeting was such a success that it was decided to have a second ST&A conference in the Scottish Highlands, probably in September of 1990. Jon Barwise will chair the program committee. A call for papers will go out early this summer. ____________ CSLI VISITORS Keith Devlin Professor of Mathematics Manchester University Dates of visit: September 1987--July 1989 Devlin is a member of the STASS and MOST projects and an occasional attender at POST meetings. He is a mathematical logician, trying to develop an information-based logic that can handle situated inference. He is writing a book, "Logic and Information," that includes a lot of the basic work on situation theory currently under development here at CSLI. Marilyn Ford Senior Lecturer Computing and Information Technology Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia Dates of visit: December 1988--June 1989 Ford is visiting CSLI again to continue working with Joan Bresnan. Her interests include reasoning and natural-language perception and production. Hideyuki Nakashima Researcher Cognitive Science Section Electrotechnical Laboratory, Japan Dates of visit: February--May 1989 Nakashima is a member of the CAST and STASS projects. A programming language based on ST called PROSIT is being developed in the CAST project. His research interests include knowledge representation, nonmonotonic reasoning, combination of learning and ST, and a computer model of language acquisition. Hiroyuki Suzuki Researcher Tokyo Systems Research Department Corporate Engineering Division Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. Dates of visit: September 1987--April 1989 Suzuki, who is visiting CSLI as a Corporate Scholar, is a member of the CAST, STASS, and SITSEM projects. His research interests include computer science, natural-language processing, and especially Japanese discourse understanding. ------------------------------ To: nl-kr@cs.rpi.edu Date: Mon, 10 Apr 89 10:59:31 AST >From: carole hafner Subject: AI and Law Conference - Program Announcement PROGRAM ANNOUNCEMENT ICAIL-89 - The Second International Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Law June 13-16, 1989 University of British Columbia Vancouver, BC CANADA Sponsored by: Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia In Coooperation with ACM SIGART Additional Support from: IBM Canada Ltd. The Center for Law and Computer Science, Northeastern University To receive registration material contact: Ms. Rita Laffey School of Law, Northeastern University (617)437-3346 For information about exhibits or local arrangements contact: Ms. Rosemarie Page Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia (604)228-2944 SCHEDULE OF EVENTS Tuesday, June 13 5:00 p.m. - 9:00 p.m. - Registration and Reception, Gage Conference Center (Registration will continue through the conference) Wednesday, June 14 8:30 a.m. - 12:30 p.m. - Tutorials and Workshop 2:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m. - Welcome, Paper Presentations, and Invited Talk 7:00 p.m. - Gala Banquet Banquet Speaker: The Honorable Chief Justice Beverly M. McLachlin Supreme Court of British Columbia Thursday-Friday, June 15-16 8:30 a.m. - 6:00 p.m. - Paper Presentations, Invited Talk, and Panel Thursday evening, June 15 - Salmon Barbecue, Museum of Anthropology INVITED TALKS "The Marriage of AI and Law - A New Analytical Jurisprudence" Donald H. Berman, Richardson Professor of Law, Northeastern University "`That reminds me of a story' - How Memory Organization Supports Retrieval of Relevant Cases" Roger C. Schank, Professor of Computer Science, Yale University PANEL DISCUSSION "Research Funding for AI and Law: Opportunities and Pitfalls." Moderated by J.C. Smith, Professor of Law and Directory of the Legal Expert Systems Project, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia TUTORIALS Tutorial A. "Artificial Intelligence and Law: Opportunities and Challenges" Donald H. Berman, Richardson Professor of Law, Northeastern University Carole D. Hafner, Associate Professor of Computer Science, Northeastern Univ. Tutorial B. "Case-Based Reasoning" Kevin D. Ashley, Ph.D., J.D. WORKSHOP "Deontic Logic." Presented by Andrew J. I. Jones, Professor of Philosophy, University of Oslo, Norway RESEARCH PRESENTATIONS Toward a Computational Theory of Arguing with Precedents Dr. Kevin D. Ashley IBM Watson Research Laboratories Cutting Legal Loops Professor Donald H. Berman Northeastern University School of Law Representing and Reusing Explanations of Legal Precedents Mr. L. Karl Branting Department of Computer Sciences University of Texas Boyd V. Deaver - Litigation Strategies Mr. Dan Burnstein Harvard Law School Deep Models, Normative Reasoning and Legal Expert Systems Dr. T.J.M. Bench-Capon Department of Computer Science University of Liverpool, England Xcite (an expert system for naturalization cases) Dr. Andreas Galtung Norwegian Research Center For Computers and Law Representing Developing Legal Doctrine A Problem for AI Programs Dr. Anne v.d.L. Gardner Atherton, CA A System for Planning Arguments and Searching Interpretation Spaces Dr. Thomas F. Gordon German National Research Center for Computer Science Sankt Augustin, Federal Republic of Germany A Specialized Expert System for Judicial Decision Support Dr. L.V. Kale Department of Computer Science University of Illinois The Treatment of Negation in Logic Programs for Representing Legislation Dr. Robert Kowalski Department of Computing Imperial College, London, ENGLAND LESTER: Using Paradigm Cases in a Quasi-Precedential Legal Domain Dr. Kenneth A. Lambert Department of Computer Science Washington and Lee University, Lexington, VA The Design of an Attorney's Statistical Consultant Dr. Leonard S. Lutomski The American Institutes for Research Expert Systems in Case-Based Law: The Hearsay Rule Advisor Dr. Marilyn T. MacCrimmon The University of British Columbia Vancouver, CANADA Representing the Structure of a Legal Argument Ms. Catherine C. Marshall Xerox Palo Alto Research Center Palo Alto, CA LRS Legal Reasoning System Professor Antonio A. Martino Istituto per la Documentazione Giuridica Del Consiglio Nazionale Delle Richerche, ITALY A Language for Legal Discourse Dr. L. Thorne McCarty Rutgers University New Brunswick, NJ An Attempted Dimensional Analysis of the Law Governing Government Appeals in Criminal Cases Mr. Simon Mendelson Cambridge, MA 02140 Market Realities of Rule-Based Software for Lawyers Where the Rubber Meets the Road Mr. Rees Morrison, Esq. Price Waterhouse New York, NY Building GRANDJUR Using Evidence and Other Knowledge to Prepare Casefiles Dr. Roger D. Purdy School of Law The University of Akron, OHIO Dimension-Based Analysis of Hypotheticals from Supreme Court Oral Argument Dr. Edwina L. Rissland Dept. of Computer Science University of Massachusetts, Amherst Interpreting Statutory Predicates Dr. Edwina L. Rissland Mr. David B. Skalak Dept. of Computer Science University of Massachusetts, Amherst Legal Information Retrieval A Hybrid Approach Dr. Daniel E. Rose Institute for Cognitive Science University of California, San Diego A Framework for Legal Knowledge Base Construction Dr. Tom Routen Department of Computer Science Leicester Polytechnic, ENGLAND EPS II Estate Planning With Prototypes (with L. T. McCarty) Mr. Dean A. Schlobohm Stanford Law School, Stanford CA Expert Systems and ICAI in Tax Law: Killing Two Birds with one AI Stone Dr. David Sherman The Law Society of Upper Canada Toronto, CANADA ASSYST - Computer Support for Guideline Sentencing Dr. Eric Simon U.S. Sentencing Commission, Washington, D.C. Taking Advantage of Models for Legal Classification Mr. David Skalak Dept. of Computer Science University of Massachusetts, Amherst The Latent Damage System A Jurisprudential Analysis Dr. Richard Susskind Ernst and Whinney London ENGLAND PROLEXS, A Model to Implement Legal Knowledge Mr. P.H. van den Berg Computer/Law Institute Juridische Faculteit Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, THE NETHERLANDS Legal Reasoning - A Jurisprudential Description Dr. Peter Wahlgren The Swedish Law and Informatics Research Inst. University of Stockholm, SWEDEN CACE: Computer-Assisted Case Evaluation in the Brooklyn District Attorney's Office Mr. Steven S. Weiner Yayes, Mechling, Kleiman, Inc. Cambridge, MA 02138 Amalgamating Regulation- and Case-based Advice Systems Through Suggested Answers Dr. David E. Wolstenholme Department of Computing Imperial College, London, ENGLAND CONFERENCE COMMITTEE Robert T. Fraonson, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, Co-Chair J. C. Smith, Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia, Co-Chair Carole D. Hafner, Northeastern University, Secretary-Treasurer PROGRAM COMMITTEE: Edwina L. Rissland, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Program Chair Kevin D. Ashley, IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center Trevor J. M. Bench-Capon, University of Liverpool, ENGLAND Donald H. Berman, Northeastern University Jon Bing, University of Oslo, NORWAY Michael G. Dyer, University of California, Los Angeles Anne v.d. L. Garner, Atherton, CA L. Thorne McCarty, Rutgers University Marek J. Sergot, Imperial College, London, ENGLAND ------------------------------ End of NL-KR Digest *******************