Xref: utzoo comp.ai.neural-nets:660 sci.philosophy.tech:1123 Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!ames!lll-lcc!lll-winken!uunet!mcvax!ukc!icdoc!syma!aarons From: aarons@syma.sussex.ac.uk (Aaron Sloman) Newsgroups: comp.ai.neural-nets,sci.philosophy.tech Subject: Re: request for philosophic reactions to connectionism Summary: don't waste effort on bogus conflicts Keywords: connectionism philosophy materialism representations Message-ID: <935@syma.sussex.ac.uk> Date: 1 May 89 02:54:11 GMT References: <370@eurtrx.UUCP> Organization: School of Cognitive & Computing Sciences, Sussex Univ. UK Lines: 116 hans@eurtrx.UUCP (Hans Schermer) writes: > Date: 20 Apr 89 10:40:46 GMT > > Can anyone out there give me a hand? > I am looking for philosophical papers, books or articles, with reactions > to connectionism as a model for the mind. > I would be interested in texts discussing representationalism, (sub)symbolic > representations, materialism, and other philosophical subjects that could be > influenced by a connectionist theory of the mind. > .....etc..... Here's my pennyworth. I am amazed when people try to produce philosophical arguments to show that connectionist models are superior, or inferior, to other kinds of AI models of mental processes. Instead of getting involved in these silly disputes, people should try to understand the rich multiplicity of function of the human mind and try to see what kinds of architectures might account for that multiplicity, and what kinds of mechanisms are capable of fitting in to those architectures in order to fulfil the roles required. For example the mechanisms required for low level vision are likely to be somewhat different from the mechanisms used in multiplying 395 by 11 in your head. Both are likely to be different from (though they may overlap with) the mechanisms involved in associative retrieval of stored memories on the basis of partial matches ("Suzie had a little goat" Yes? No? who had what then?) Then there is our ability to store and retrieve intricate detail exactly, as when we memorize a long poem or a piano sonata. Different again must be the mechanisms by which new motives (desires, fears, wishes, and the like) are generated (by physical needs, by perceiving something in the environment, by thinking about past events or future possibilities etc). These motives, in turn, interact in many intricate ways with other motives, beliefs, percepts, personality traits, etc. Some, but not all, motives(desires) become intentions. ("Yes, I will try to get ...." or "That is very tempting, but I mustn't..."). Planning processes sometimes arise out of intentions ("Now, how can I get that box open. Perhaps I can borrow a crow-bar from Jim, though I'll have to offer him something in return, he's so mean...Now where can I find him. His wife will know..."). But sometimes intentions directly interact with percepts to generate behaviour controlled by tight feedback loops (like bringing your car to a gentle stop just at the traffic lights). Some kinds of abilities seem to encompass a finite or fixed dimensional range of possibilities (e.g. the set of ways of moving your arm so that your forefinger moves quickly in a smooth path from touching one thing to touching another?) whereas other abilities involve a kind of generative competence that implies unbounded complexity, at least in principle, (e.g. the set of algebraic expressions you can evaluate). There are very many different kinds of learning, training, development, improvement. Some kinds of actions can be achieved perfectly once you know what to do (long division). Others require training or tuning of low level mechanisms, in ways that are very hard to understand (coaxing a beautiful tone out of a violin). Some things are inaccessible to consciousness normally yet can become accessible after appropriate training, such as the use of grammatical categories in producing or understanding language. (One kind of philosophical training is concerned with this kind of heightened awareness. Compare learning phonetics.) We can do some things in parallel (walking and talking, listening and looking, enjoying a meal and a view, or seeing the different ballet dancers that form an intricate and changing pattern), yet others are difficult or impossible, like reciting two poems in your head at once. Some things are easily reversed (sing a high note and swoop down to a low note - then do it in reverse) but others not (recite a poem then say it backwards). Some kinds of mental processes are transformed by alcohol and other drugs, and some not. E.g. alcohol (in relatively small doses) may alter what you will agree to do, but it probably won't change the semantic interpretation you give to "The cat sat on the mat". There are many far more detailed requirements for explanatory mechanisms. It seems to me absurd to argue over whether either connectionist models or conventionalist AI models provide better theories of the nature of mind when it is patently clear both are still miles away from accounting for more than highly simplified versions of tiny fragments of human ability. Instead of silly squabbles we need to work both top-down (collecting requirements for adequate models and explanations), and bottom up (trying to investigate different kinds of mechanisms and finding out what can and cannot be achieved by putting them together in different ways). It seems very likely that the final story (if we ever find it) will involve many different kinds of mechanisms put together in a complex variety of ways. Attempts to do it all using one kind of technique (Production systems, Logic, PDP mechanisms) will then just look silly. Aaron Sloman, School of Cognitive and Computing Sciences, Univ of Sussex, Brighton, BN1 9QN, England INTERNET: aarons%uk.ac.sussex.cogs@nsfnet-relay.ac.uk aarons%uk.ac.sussex.cogs%nsfnet-relay.ac.uk@relay.cs.net JANET aarons@cogs.sussex.ac.uk BITNET: aarons%uk.ac.sussex.cogs@uk.ac or aarons%uk.ac.sussex.cogs%ukacrl.bitnet@cunyvm.cuny.edu UUCP: ...mcvax!ukc!cogs!aarons or aarons@cogs.uucp