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Path: utzoo!yunexus!gall
From: gall@yunexus.UUCP (Norman R. Gall)
Newsgroups: sci.philosophy.tech,can.ai,ut.ai,sci.psychology
Subject: Re: request for philosophic reactions to connectionism
Summary: Perhaps the questions that are to be answered are ill-conceived
Keywords: connectionism philosophy materialism representations wittgenstein
Message-ID: <1799@yunexus.UUCP>
Date: 3 May 89 03:49:36 GMT
Article-I.D.: yunexus.1799
References: <370@eurtrx.UUCP> <935@syma.sussex.ac.uk>
Reply-To: gall@yunexus.UUCP (Norman R. Gall)
Organization: York University   Department of Philosophy
Lines: 18

All of this discussion on 'models of mind' already presupposes that
the question of 'what mechanisms underlie the workings of the mind?'
is a coherent one.  I would like to ask: precisely what question could
possibly be answered by the 'discovery' of the actual mechanism by
which 'the mind' operates, and just what makes us think that 'the
mind' or psychological predicates 'refer' to mental processes?

Now, yes, I know that there is a very deep-rooted tradition in
psychology (generally carried on by cognitive science) that treats
psychological verbs as referring to actual mental processes, but
evidence do we have for treating them as such?  Intuition?  Empirical
evidence that is unmitigated?  Careful philosophical scrutiny of the
very concepts these psychological verbs deal with?
-- 
York University       Department of Philosophy       Toronto, Ontario, Canada
 "Don't, _for_heaven's_sake_, be afraid of talking nonsense!  But you
                    must pay attention to your nonsense." -- L. Wittgenstein
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