Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!mailrus!cornell!uw-beaver!teknowledge-vaxc!sri-unix!orawest!ejs
From: ejs@orawest.ARPA
Newsgroups: comp.ai
Subject: Re: Free will and responsibility.
Keywords: Behaviorism, materialism, dogma, science
Message-ID: <533@orawest.UUCP>
Date: 22 May 89 22:00:34 GMT
References: <10333@ihlpb.ATT.COM> <3850@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu> <52019@linus.UUCP> <1979@ucsfcca.ucsf.edu> <2492@rice-chex.ai.mit.edu>
Reply-To: ejs@ord.UUCP (e john sebes)
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In article <2492@rice-chex.ai.mit.edu> miken@wheaties.ai.mit.edu (Michael N. Nitabach) writes:
 >I have several comments regarding the recent discussion about free will
 >and behaviorism.
 >First, it seems that many of the participants have assumed that a
 >materialist stance somehow requires one to accept the validity of the
 >radical behaviorist agenda.
Actually, no-- just pointing out that this assumption of others explains
some of the negative reactions to behaviorism.
The rest of Mr. Nitabach's comments about are right on target.

 >Third, I don't understand the undercurrent of fear regarding the
 >potential sinister uses of behaviorist techniques for purposes of
 >social control.  This concern is founded on a belief that behaviorist
 >techniques *are*, in fact, successful in drastically altering the
 >social and private behaviors of human beings, including unwilling and
 >unknowing objects of these methods.  I submit that there is no evidence
 >to support this supposition, and that this fear is unfounded.
Again, I agree wholeheartedly-- and yet observe that this concern also
informs some of the negative reactions to behaviorism.

 >Second, it appears to me that the notions of free will being discussed
 >in this group all miss the mark.
I couldn't agree more.

 >{more good stuf omitted} If, on the other hand, the regularities in this
 >agent's behavior can only be explained by taking into consideration factors
 >*internal* to the agent, such as its beliefs and desires, then the
 >agent must be said to possess free will.
Metaphysically, this is not sufficient, since the internal factors could
be completely determined by prior external factors. Also, the distinction
between external and internal breaks down if you push it too hard.
Pragmatically, however, it is fine, and I agree that this is fact just
the stance that most people, including scientists, take in those moments
during their daily business such issues become relevant.

>I am new to this newsgroup, so I apologize if I am repeating arguments
>and perspectives which have already appeared here.
Only a bit, and quite succintly.
I wish more newcomers to the group caught on as well.

>Michael Nitabach                       e-mail: miken@wheaties.ai.mit.edu

John Sebes				orawest!ejs@unix.sri.com