Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!rutgers!att!cbnews!military
From: marsh@linus.UUCP (Ralph Marshall (617 271-7648))
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: Request info on force ratios in European theater
Message-ID: <6807@cbnews.ATT.COM>
Date: 23 May 89 04:32:17 GMT
References: <6710@cbnews.ATT.COM>
Sender: military@cbnews.ATT.COM
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From: marsh@linus.UUCP (Ralph Marshall (617 271-7648))
In article <6710@cbnews.ATT.COM> amdcad!cdr@ames.arc.nasa.gov (Carl Rigney) writes:
>
>Run out and buy James Dunnigan's _How to Make War: A comprehensive
>guide to modern warfare_.  Beancounting is of questionable usefulness;
>it's not enought to just count tanks, you also have to determine their
>quality WITH RESPECT TO their environment, doctrine, and opponent's
>doctrine.  William Morrow just published a completely revised edition
>in 1988; ISBN is 0-688-07979-2 in softcover.  It's the best overall
>book on factors in modern warfare I know of, but I'd be delighted to
>hear other people's choices.

	I have to disagree with you.  I read Dunnigan's book, and I
didn't think it was all that hot.  He had a number of typos and printing
errors that made me a little suspicious about the quality of the charts
full of numbers.  I liked some of his comments, especially the one which
states something like "The abilities that make for a good combat commander
usually make for a bad peacetime officer; hence, after a long period of
peace most units will be commanded by people who are excellent politicians
but terrible commanders."

	The basic problem with writing a book about contemporary
force structures is the same one that plagues the Pentagon: we haven't
sent 10's of divisions to Germany in a few weeks to stop a mobile army
backed up by tactical nukes and gas, so we have NO IDEA what it will
really be like.  We obviously have to make some guess, since the only other
choice is to plan to "improvise", which probably won't work this time
around.

	What I think we need to see is more realistic training and testing
units and equipment.  Modern tanks are too expensive to practice blowing
them up with the latest anti-tank weapon, so we simulate it instead.  This
is all well and good, but too much simulation and your results no longer
match what will happen when the line of sight is much shorter/longer than
on your proving ground, when the thing gets mud/dust/water in it, and when
some grunt humping it around on his back drops it every once in a while.
If we were willing to spend more money testing and perfecting systems under
realistic situations they'd probably work more like we intended.  Since w
don't, it is very hard for either the military brass or an outside author
like Dunnigan to make accurate predictions about what will happen in
a large scale war.


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Ralph Marshall (marsh@mbunix.mitre.org)

Disclaimer:  Often wrong but never in doubt...  All of these opinions
are mine, so don't gripe to my employer if you don't like them.
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