Xref: utzoo comp.sys.ibm.pc:29873 comp.sys.intel:836
Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!rutgers!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!ucbvax!pasteur!ames!killer!jls
From: jls@killer.DALLAS.TX.US (Jerome Schneider)
Newsgroups: comp.sys.ibm.pc,comp.sys.intel
Subject: Re: 80286, 80386 LOADALL instructions.
Summary: Privileged instruction?
Keywords: LOADALL 80386
Message-ID: <8312@killer.DALLAS.TX.US>
Date: 8 Jun 89 02:46:52 GMT
References: <30105@conexch.UUCP> <213@guardian.UUCP> <30480@conexch.UUCP>
Organization: Aspen Technology Group, Ft. Collins, CO
Lines: 15

In article <30480@conexch.UUCP>, rob@conexch.UUCP (Robert Collins) writes:
> [,,,, edited...]
> I have a written document from Intel stating their intension to remove
> the '386 loadall from the next mask...but that doesn't mean I believe
> it.  In fact, to the contrary, I don't believe it.  I subscribe to the
> theory that Intel is just tired of the phone calls.

Is the LOADALL instruction disabled except for core privilege level?  If
not, it would please me greatly for Intel to remove such a dastardly
code from new *86 chips.  How can a reliable multi-tasking system
protect itself if some process executes garbage that happens to contain a
LOADALL.  Is this the new virus for 386/ix?
-- 
Jerome Schneider              UUCP: killer.DALLAS.TX.US!jls (guest account)
Aspen Technology Group        Ft. Collins, CO    Voice: (303) 484-8466