Xref: utzoo comp.ai:5244 talk.philosophy.misc:3318 sci.philosophy.tech:1796
Path: utzoo!attcan!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!wuarchive!mit-eddie!rutgers!att!cbnewsh!mbb
From: mbb@cbnewsh.ATT.COM (martin.b.brilliant)
Newsgroups: comp.ai,talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Can Machines Think?
Message-ID: <6724@cbnewsh.ATT.COM>
Date: 19 Dec 89 16:57:30 GMT
References: <31821@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu>
Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories
Lines: 28

From article <31821@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu>, by dave@cogsci.indiana.edu
(David Chalmers)...

Slightly edited to make the bones barer:

  1. Systems with an appropriate causal structure think.
  2. Programs are a way of formally specifying causal structures.
  3. Physical systems implement programs.
  4. Physical systems which implement the appropriate program think.

I take it that (1) is an acceptable definition.  Does anybody think it
begs the question?

The weakest link here may be (2), the supposition that programs can
implement any causal structure whatever, even those that do what we
call thinking.

The software/hardware duality question is semantically resolved by (3).

The conclusion is (4), which seems to assert "strong AI."

M. B. Brilliant					Marty
AT&T-BL HO 3D-520	(201) 949-1858
Holmdel, NJ 07733	att!hounx!marty1 or marty1@hounx.ATT.COM
After retirement on 12/30/89 use att!althea!marty or marty@althea.UUCP

Disclaimer: Opinions stated herein are mine unless and until my employer
	    explicitly claims them; then I lose all rights to them.