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From: ladkin@icsib (Peter Ladkin)
Newsgroups: comp.ai,talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.tech
Subject: Re: Can Machines Think?
Message-ID: <20854@pasteur.Berkeley.EDU>
Date: 20 Dec 89 20:00:10 GMT
References: <6724@cbnewsh.ATT.COM> <5767@uhccux.uhcc.hawaii.edu> <5610@rice-chex.ai.mit.edu>
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Reply-To: ladkin@icsib (Peter Ladkin)
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In-reply-to: miken@wheaties.ai.mit.edu (Michael N. Nitabach)

In article <5610@rice-chex.ai.mit.edu>, miken@wheaties (Michael N. Nitabach) writes:
>This view of the fundamental nature of causation derives from a particular
>metaphysical tradition, beginning with the British Empiricists, e.g. Locke
>and Hume.  This is the view that causation is not an aspect of the world
>which our mentality can recognize, but rather a schema which our mind imposes
>on events with appropriate spatiotemporal relations.

this is hardly locke's view, and barely that of hume. locke rather strongly
held that primary qualities of matter caused secondary qualities. this 
causation was not a product of anything like a mental schema. and `events
with appropriate spatiotemporal relations' were not the only inhabitants
of the physical world. you might also count bishop berkeley in with the
other two, and for him causation was `in the world'. of course, it
got there by being in the intention of a god, for him. all this is 
well-known and well-researched material. so much for summarising the
views of the british empiricists.

peter ladkin