Path: utzoo!attcan!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!rutgers!att!chinet!les From: les@chinet.chi.il.us (Leslie Mikesell) Newsgroups: comp.unix.wizards Subject: Re: What should the password/security/userinfo/login system include? Message-ID: <1989Dec17.032435.5042@chinet.chi.il.us> Date: 17 Dec 89 03:24:35 GMT References: <4180@sbcs.sunysb.edu> <1989Dec7.172233.10130@chinet.chi.il.us> <1989Dec15.182256.5912@sq.sq.com> Reply-To: les@chinet.chi.il.us (Leslie Mikesell) Distribution: usa Organization: Chinet - Chicago Public Access UNIX Lines: 41 In article <1989Dec15.182256.5912@sq.sq.com> lee@sq.com (Liam R. E. Quin) writes: >les@chinet.chi.il.us (Leslie Mikesell) writes: [logging failed login attempts] >This of course poses a considerable security risk. >Consider the case that you typed "rot" instead of "root" and gave the >correct root password. It gets logged, and anyone who can look at the log >can see the root password. A). I'm only interested in the dialup lines. If someone has trouble locally, I'll walk over and help them. This means that there won't be anyone logging in as root. B). I would only log completely failing attempts (i.e. the line drops before they get in), not every typo. This doesn't happen often unless there is a real problem. Anyone who knows what they are doing would change their password after this happens on the chance that they were typing into a trojan login program anyway. C). The logfile would (of course) only be readable by root. I'd be happy to encrypt it, but how do I pass the encryption key to the login program? >Your system is now *less* secure, because you have to protect the log file. >Recent trends such as keeping the encrypted passwords in /etc/shadow where >only root can see them are an improvement completely defeated if all I have >to do is read the raw disk to find the root password. Can you read the raw disk if you don't already have the root password? If you can do stuff like that, why not just watch the clist buffers and catch them on the fly? Our alternative is to keep a monitor terminal available to bridge onto the modem lines, which is not particularly secure either. It is also not very handy, since the calls mostly come in to a single number that the phone switch rolls over as needed so we don't know ahead of time where a particular call is going to land. Les Mikesell les@chinet.chi.il.us