Path: utzoo!attcan!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!rutgers!bellcore!att!cbnews!military From: Brian Ross (bxr307@coombs.anu.oz) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Re: Low tech warfare Message-ID: <12361@cbnews.ATT.COM> Date: 15 Dec 89 03:09:54 GMT Sender: military@cbnews.ATT.COM Lines: 144 Approved: military@att.att.com From: Brian Ross (bxr307@coombs.anu.oz) >From: terryr@cse.ogi.edu (Terry Rooker) >In article <12150@cbnews.ATT.COM> Brian Ross (bxr307@coombs.anu.oz) writes: [My comments about US military incompetence in Vietnam deleted] > >Actually elements of the US military made that realization many years >ago. Part of the problem was (is) that the military's reason for >existence was a European war. Everything was justified in those >terms, and much of the training was geared towards that end. It >was only natural that commanders in Vietnam tried to adapt their >training to the situation. That training emphasized firepower and >destruction of the enemy. Obviously out of place in a low intensity >conflict (LIC). Some elements of the military responded admirably >to the demands of LIC. The original conception of the army special >forces was certainly not high-tech. The original SEAL teams were >low tech groups of individuals, although lately they seem to have >been bitten by the high-tech bug. They used some high-tech equipment >but the bulk of their work was done with weapons no more advanced than >Stoners and rubber boats. The entirety of the USN riverine and >coastal forces was low-tech and low budget. PBR's were based on a >commercially available stock hull. PCF's were based on a commercial >work boat. The only new keel up design was the ASPB, and it was >admirably suited to riverine work. The air force also broke out >of the European mould with the AC-47, AC-119, and AC-130 series of >gunships. These airplanes are only usable where you have locally >guaranteed control of the air, such as in most LIC. Yes thats true. However even those services that did "adapt" as you put it still grasped the wrong end of the stick. They attempted to make use of these new "low-tech" adaption as an end unto themselves. The US Govt. and military high command failed to realise that, while its all good and true to have gunships, air-cushion vehicles and other "adapted" items for use in Vietnam, they'd missed out two major important factors in a counter-insurgency campaign. First you must inhibit the enemy's ability to operate "at will". In counter-insurgency the only way to accomplish that is to find and close with the enemy and actually occupy the ground where he is operating. Second, you must attempt to win the "hearts and minds" of the local population. Attempt to show to them that your idealogy is better than his and that if the locals support you they will receive things that are not possible under the opposition's rule. This is the single most important factor the US missed. The civil aid programs they did attempt were looking, like their military programs, for results quicker than they could be achieved. In addition the South Vietnamese government was unwilling to make any concessions which were really the things required to win over the South Vietnamese population. The whole war was a mistake of attempting to apply a military solution to what was primarily a political problem. With both the civil and military aid programs, when they failed to produce quick results the US Govt. then decided to try something new. The result was a succession of "quick fixes" which failed to produce anything concrete which could be built on. On top of which the various civil-military agencies (eg the CIA) were also applying their own attempts at solutions with the result that chaos and confusion reigned as to what was actually working or not working. The US involvement in Vietnam basically lacked strategic direction. There was no real co-ordination or direction of the various agencies involved in the war. This is where the Australian approach in Phuc Thui province was superior. We had a strategic direction (eliminate the enemy and win the locals over to support the South Vietnam government) and the tactical training to accomplish it. Our forces had considerable experience in Jungle Warfare in WWII, in the Malayan emergency and in Borneo during the "confrontation" with Indonesia. Our troops also served a full tour of duty as a unit, not individuals. This meant Esprit de Corps was created and maintained during training in Australia and built upon during their tour in Vietnam. On top of this we were not afraid to go out into the forest and actually "take and hold the ground" the enemy was attempting to occupy. When co-ordinated with an effective "hearts and minds" campaign the result was that we had a pacified province in a decidedly unpacified country. The question then is who's strategy and tactics worked better? [stuff about US over-reliance on technology as a solution to war deleted] I am not questioning the US attempting to find a technical solution to war. Nor am I criticising the US reliance on a strategy of attrition and strategic denial in a conventional war. In a counter insurgency campaign it will basically not work. You are not so much fighting a person in counter-insurgency as an ideal. That ideal is, "that under the present regime (it does not matter the colour of that regime's politics. It works both ways if it is a corrupt unpopular regime) you, the locals, are oppressed. My different ideal (the insurgents) is better and if I win power I will make things much better for you." That is what must be defeated. It is basically a political problem to which a political solution must be applied (although the military are an aid in such a situation they cannot cure it by themselves). It is also one which takes considerable time. The Malayan insurgent "Emergency" has only just ended (a fortnight ago in fact according to the local TV news) 30 years after it started with the final surrender of the last Malayan Peoples' Communist party insurgents on the Thai- Malay border. What I am questioning is the basic over-reliance on technology which means that instead of actually putting people on the ground and occupying it. Showing to the local population that you have a real commitment to their well being. The US sends in fighters, bombers and helicopters, pounds the area flat and shoots innocent people in the fields, simply because they are wearing "black pyjamas" and live in an area where the insurgents are operating. Such "free- fire zones" do not win the "hearts and minds" of the local inhabitants. Nor do such things prevent the enemy from being able to operate when he/she wishes. The only way to do that is to move troops in on the ground and they try and outfight the enemy at his own game. It means establishing a base in the area. It also means aggressive, offensive patrolling. You must seek out the enemy and kill him. The only way your going to that in a counter-insurgency campaign is to train your troops to fight in the same way the enemy does. If you attempt to apply lessons learnt on the northern plains of Europe to the Jungles of SE Asia your asking for trouble. The question is, has the US military learnt this? Or can we see the same mistakes being applied in El Salvador? And if they knew that the training that was right for Europe was wrong for Vietnam why didn't they correct it? _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ -_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- | Brian Ross |Snail Mail:- "Bill Bracket the self-made man who came| in a packet" | Brian Ross ----------------------------------------| Sociology Dept.R.S.S.S. E-Mail Addresses:- bxr307@coombs.anu.oz | Australian National University | CANBERRA,A.C.T.,2601, bxr307@csc.anu.oz | AUSTRALIA | _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ -_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- -----------------------------------------------------------------