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From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker)
Newsgroups: sci.military
Subject: Re: Low tech warfare
Message-ID: <12398@cbnews.ATT.COM>
Date: 18 Dec 89 04:55:16 GMT
References: <12361@cbnews.ATT.COM>
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From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker)
In article <12361@cbnews.ATT.COM> Brian Ross (bxr307@coombs.anu.oz) writes:
>
>
[lots of discussion deleted]
>way your going to that in a counter-insurgency campaign is to train
> your troops to fight in the same way the enemy does.   If
>you attempt to apply lessons learnt on the northern plains of
>Europe to the Jungles of SE Asia your asking for trouble.   The
>question is, has the US military learnt this?  Or can we see the
>same mistakes being applied in El Salvador?  And if they knew that 
>the training that was right for Europe was wrong for Vietnam why didn't 
>they correct it?
>
First, I am not defending the American military system.  I resigned my
commission in disgust over many of the problems you mentioned.  It
doesn't appear that the military has learned its lesson.  Even those
elements that learned to adapt are now pursuing the high tech "dream".
I served at one of the last riverine units and my training was
conducted without any "gadgets".  Two years later I was chasstised
because I expected a patro of recently qualified crews to operate
without night vision goggles, and radar.  Look at all the high tech
gear that the special forces are receiving.

Even you specify a military solution to counter insurgencies.  One of
the most overlooked, and most important lessons of the response to the
Malayan emergency was that the government took every step to prevent a
military response.  Most of the intelligence work was done by police
(specially trained but police nonetheless).  Most of the actions
taken by the "hearts and minds" programs were done by non-military
agencies.  Yes there was military action in the jungles, but the
intent was to avoid it as much as possible and when it was required to
use the smallest force required.  The tactics you describe were used
to good effect.  There were even RAF heavy bomber stikes when a
communist Terrorist (CT) base was found and could not be neutralized
by other means.  But all of these military actions were of the last
resort.  Other methods were tried first.  Curiously, the Malayan
Emergency was used as an example for the American effort in Vietnam,
after all it was (and is) one of the few examples of a successful
counter-insurgency campaign in the post war period.  We missed the
main non-military point (probably because it was the military that was
tasked with the counter-insurgency), and applied the other lessons in
a thoroughly American way.

For the record, the British in Malaya had several advantages that
weren't in Vietnam.  The government could trace its existence back
before the war, where the RVN governemnt was largely a late 1950's
fabrication.  The people of Malaya truly liked the government.  There
was not rampant corruption.  The bulk of the populace was Muslim, and
therefore appropriate harsh measure were possible.  The CT's were
largely Chinese, and the Chinese representation in the overall
population while large is not overwhelming.  




-- 
Terry Rooker
terryr@cse.ogi.edu