Path: utzoo!attcan!uunet!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!att!cbnews!military From: phipps@solitary (Geoff Phipps) Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Vietnam: Australian and US strategies Message-ID: <12399@cbnews.ATT.COM> Date: 18 Dec 89 04:55:22 GMT Sender: military@cbnews.ATT.COM Lines: 92 Approved: military@att.att.com From: Geoff Phipps Brian Ross (bxr307@coombs.anu.oz) has been writing about the differing strategies pursued by US and Australian Forces in Vietnam. I can't claim to be an expert, I wasn't there and I have only read a few books on the subject, but I do see things a little differently from him. While I would agree that a hi-tech solution to such a war is impossible (unless you have the political support for genocide), I don't think the Australian strategy would have worked either. As usual comparisons have been made to the Malayan Emergency. If you look at the two wars I think you will see that the strategies available to the Commonwealth in Malaya were simply not available to the US in Vietnam. For example: In 1948 Malaya was still part of the Empire, hence Britain had COMPLETE CONTROL over the government. There had never been much indigenous support for independence, so anti-European feelings weren't high. The first (and subsequent) Malaysian governments were also pro-British (they owed their existence to the British, anti-colonial elements were supporting the communists in the jungle). vs. South Vietnam was an independent country, the US could only influence its government. It had recently emerged from a battle of liberation against foreign domination, so foreigners weren't well received. The Malaysian Government and Civil Service and Police were fairly free of corruption. vs The RVN civil service had been filled by the French with collaborators, who were drawn to their administrative positions by the promise of wealth. Things hadn't changed much, the ruling cliques and many middle officials were incredibly corrupt. The Malayan government gave land titles to previously unlanded Chinese farmers (although this was done as part of a population relocation). vs The RVN government was unwilling to implement reforms that would have swayed the peasants (e.g. land reform). The Malaysian Communists were almost all Chinese. Ethnic Chinese were about a third of the population, so the Communist's population base was limited. vs. The Vietcong were Vietnamese. Malaysia had been part of the Empire, so the people of the Commonwealth had some attachment to the place. vs Few Americans knew where Vietnam was before the US became involved. ***************** So much for Hearts and Minds. As for more traditional military matters: (West) Malaya has a very short land border, and with only foreign country (I'm ignoring the parts of Malaysia in Borneo because no fighting in the Emergency took place there. Of course during the confrontation with Indonesia things got a bit hot). The Various Royal Navies could stop most seaborne supplies. vs South Vietnam had very long land borders. The USN probably stopped much of the seaborne supply (here I'm guessing). The Malaysian Communists were lucky to have automatic weapons. vs the Vietcong always had AK-47's and mortars, progressing to rockets etc. ********** I agree that the only (known) way to win a civil war like Vietnam or Malaya is to pursue the political front and the military front in parallel. In Malaya the Commonwealth was able to do that, the US could not do that in Vietnam because it had to act through the corrupt RVN administration. Militarily you have to use lots of infantry on the ground to close with the enemy and either kill him or drive him away from the population. You also have to avoid killing neutral civilians (or they become enemy). Artillery can't do this. The only way to stop the North from supporting subversion in the South and/or crossing the border would have been to invade the North. This was not politically possible. Hence victory was impossible on either front in Vietnam. ************ I am also an Australian, and have engaged in my share of "yank-bashing", but I don't think we would have done much better in Vietnam. Geoff Phipps, phipps@solitary.stanford.edu Stanford University, Computer Science Department