Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!cs.utexas.edu!tut.cis.ohio-state.edu!rutgers!att!cbnews!military From: bxr307@csc.anu.oz Newsgroups: sci.military Subject: Re: Low tech warfare Message-ID: <12458@cbnews.ATT.COM> Date: 20 Dec 89 07:03:17 GMT Sender: military@cbnews.ATT.COM Organization: Computer Services, Australian National University Lines: 175 Approved: military@att.att.com From: bxr307@csc.anu.oz From: terryr@ogicse.ogc.edu (Terry Rooker) In article <12361@cbnews.ATT.COM>> Brian Ross (bxr307@coombs.anu.oz) writes: >> >> [lots of discussion deleted] >>way your going to that in a counter-insurgency campaign is to train >> your troops to fight in the same way the enemy does. If >>you attempt to apply lessons learnt on the northern plains of >>Europe to the Jungles of SE Asia your asking for trouble. The >>question is, has the US military learnt this? Or can we see the >>same mistakes being applied in El Salvador? And if they knew that >>the training that was right for Europe was wrong for Vietnam why didn't >>they correct it? >> >First, I am not defending the American military system. I resigned my >commission in disgust over many of the problems you mentioned. It >doesn't appear that the military has learned its lesson. Even those >elements that learned to adapt are now pursuing the high tech "dream". >I served at one of the last riverine units and my training was >conducted without any "gadgets". Two years later I was chasstised >because I expected a patro of recently qualified crews to operate >without night vision goggles, and radar. Look at all the high tech >gear that the special forces are receiving. Good! I am glad that there is (or was :-( ) at least one American officer with some sense! My experience of exercising with US Forces (while admittedly limited to only the Marines) has left me wondering for a long time as to whether of not any of them had any intelligence. Most seemed rather seduced by the images presented by Hollywood's worst efforts like "Rambo". I was in particular disappointed by the poor discipline in basic matters like camouflage and cleanliness of personal equipment. They seemed to either completely over do it or not bother at all. There seemed to be no uniform application of orders concerning, what admittedly are, very small matters but which point to what I percieve was basic problems in the US military system. I will though take my hat off to you for serving in Riverine forces. Those boys in Vietnam where unusual in that they actually attempted to go where the enemy was (in perhaps the most difficult country in Vietnam) and prevent him from being able to operate undisturbed. And going by my limited reading on the topic you achieved considerable success, didn't you? >Even you specify a military solution to counter insurgencies. One of >the most overlooked, and most important lessons of the response to the >Malayan emergency was that the government took every step to prevent a >military response. Most of the intelligence work was done by police >(specially trained but police nonetheless). Most of the actions >taken by the "hearts and minds" programs were done by non-military >agencies. Yes there was military action in the jungles, but the >intent was to avoid it as much as possible and when it was required to >use the smallest force required. The tactics you describe were used >to good effect. There were even RAF heavy bomber stikes when a >communist Terrorist (CT) base was found and could not be neutralized >by other means. But all of these military actions were of the last >resort. Other methods were tried first. Curiously, the Malayan >Emergency was used as an example for the American effort in Vietnam, >after all it was (and is) one of the few examples of a successful >counter-insurgency campaign in the post war period. We missed the >main non-military point (probably because it was the military that was >tasked with the counter-insurgency), and applied the other lessons in >a thoroughly American way. >For the record, the British in Malaya had several advantages that >weren't in Vietnam. The government could trace its existence back >before the war, where the RVN governemnt was largely a late 1950's >fabrication. The people of Malaya truly liked the government. There >was not rampant corruption. The bulk of the populace was Muslim, and >therefore appropriate harsh measure were possible. The CT's were >largely Chinese, and the Chinese representation in the overall >population while large is not overwhelming. While I discussed only the military side of the solution to a counter-insurgency it was because of the nature of the newsgroup, not becasue I ignored the political side. In fact if you go back and read my original posting you will see that I mention it several times. The problem is (and I am sure that Bill, the moderater will agree) is that I have attempted to post politico-military matters before and been prevented from posting. So I have as much as possible limited myself to only the military aspect of the Australian vs US efforts in Vietnam. I could, if you desire, go into long postings on the failures of Australian, and for that matter, US Foreign policy in relation to Vietnam. However that lies outside this newsgroup as does any discussion about the "legality" or the "morality" of foreign involvement in what was basically a civil war. I am glad though, that you have brought up some of the differences between the situation in Vietnam and Malaya/sia (depending on which in time we are talking about. :-). Anyway, what I was trying to get at was that the US military effort in Vietnam was totally out of proportion to the problem presented. The US Army in particular lost sight of what I called in my previous posting that you must "First you must inhibit the enemy ability to operate `at will'." The only way to do that is by the use of your military forces to initially isolate and protect the local inhabitants (that is those who don't want to help the enemy! :-) ). This is to remove, what Mao called the "sea" of the population from the "fish", the guerrillas, would swim in. After that had been achieved the military would then be used to force outwards and attempt to inhibit the enemies ability to move around the countryside. While the main role of the military is to provide protection to the civic-aid teams it also a secondary role of basically providing labour to help in the "hearts and minds" campaign. It builds and staffs things like clinics, food warehouses, sanitation systems. That is the main reason why the Australian army in most of its overseas deployments (other than Vietnam) provides Engineers rather than infantry. They build roads and other public works which the local government has neither the money nor the expertise to do. While in Vietnam it was difficult to segregate the VC from the civilians. It was possible. The strategic hamlet program was based upon the experience of the British in Malaya. However while in Malaya it was easier because of the ethnic differences between the native Malays and the Communist Chinese. In Vietnam they all came from the same stock. However the strategic hamlet program was applied half- heartedly at best and because of considerable corruption was prevented from working by the failure to follow up with an effective hearts and minds campaign. If it had been applied sensibly and sensitively it would have ensured that the VC had been isolated from its "sea" of population. In addition the US Army was unable to see that while Malaya was an example it was not the "be all and end all" of how to run a sucessful counter-insurgency campiagn. The differences between the two situations have already been detailed (and very well too) by Geoff Phipps in his posting. However even the various British and Australian advisors employed by the US aid team in Vietnam all said that as well. What they advised the South Vietnam Government and the US was that basically the only way to defeat an insurgency is to let it win! That is, give in to the basic political demands of the insurgents. Make reforms in your government, force changes in society. This will rob the insurgents of the support that they have in the population. Remember I said it was an idea, not men you are fighting. This was how the British won in Malaya. It promised independence. It gave the population benefits like land ownership. It introduced better health care. It gave them and their children free education. Basically they robbed the insurgents of the very ground they were standing on! That plus the basic antipathy felt between the Malays and the Chinese ensured that the insurgency would fail. In Vietnam however the very nature of the South's government prevented that from happening. It was a corrupt legacy of outside interference by first the French and then the US in the 1950's. While the US had basically created it, the US did not control it. That is the crux of the matter. The US could not (or would not) force the South's Goverment to institute real reforms. What was needed was a rvolution and that was what was happening. Not an invasion by another country as the US Government liked to justify its involvement. Instead they just kept on shoring the government up (under the old belief that while, "he's a son of bitch. At least he's our son of a bitch!). This is where the US failed. It was not only a failure of the military solution. It was a failure to find a realistic political one for the South Vietnamese Government which caused the US defeat in Vietnam. It was obviously a replay of the military maxim of "pick your ground to fight on." A failure to recognise that meant the defeat of the US was on the cards from the very beginning. However that digresses from the purpose of my original posting. My question was whether the US military had learnt the lessons from its experience in Vietnam. Terry seems to think not. Are there any other takers out there? _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ -_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_- | Brian Ross |Snail Mail:- "Bill Bracket the self-made man who came| in a packet" | Brian Ross ----------------------------------------| Sociology Dept.R.S.S.S. E-Mail Addresses:- bxr307@coombs.anu.oz | Australian National University | CANBERRA,A.C.T.,2601, bxr307@csc.anu.oz | AUSTRALIA | _-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_ -_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-