Xref: utzoo comp.ai:5341 talk.philosophy.misc:3402 sci.philosophy.tech:1860 Path: utzoo!utgpu!jarvis.csri.toronto.edu!clyde.concordia.ca!uunet!cs.utexas.edu!usc!apple!amdahl!kp From: kp@uts.amdahl.com (Ken Presting) Newsgroups: comp.ai,talk.philosophy.misc,sci.philosophy.tech Subject: Re: Can Machines Think? Message-ID: <09dh023L7b7r01@amdahl.uts.amdahl.com> Date: 3 Jan 90 19:56:59 GMT References: <31821@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu> <32029@iuvax.cs.indiana.edu> <21606@mimsy.umd.edu> Reply-To: kp@amdahl.uts.amdahl.com (Ken Presting) Distribution: na Organization: Amdahl Corporation, Sunnyvale CA Lines: 34 In article <21606@mimsy.umd.edu> flink@mimsy.umd.edu (Paul V Torek) writes: >kp@amdahl.uts.amdahl.com (Ken Presting) writes: >>If a numerical model of the brain is claimed to be accurate except for >>"noise", and therefore claimed to be conscious, then it must be shown >>that what is called "noise" is irrelevant to consciousness (or thinking). > >Are you suggesting that >(a) Some types of conscious thought might go wrong were it not for the > "noise", or >(b) Although a "noiseless" system might pass the Turing Test, "noise" > might be necessary for consciousness to exist at all? >(Or something else?) > >Most of the rest of your article suggests (a), but (b) strikes me as a >more interesting thesis. I can't think of any argument against (b). I have in mind the "something else". The point about noise in chaotic systems arises as an objection to the argument that if all other attempts at AI fail, at least we can numerically model the phyics of the brain. For this argument to work, we need to be sure that we really *can* make an accurate model. Chaotic systems can mechanically amplify small discrepancies in initial state, such as noise. Numerical models trade speed for precision, so if a model is to have the arbitrary precision needed to eliminate all discrepancies, the model would run well behind real time, and fail the Turing test. I think (b) is reversed. Random brain events are probably important in human behavior, thus affecting the Turing test. But at least the sort of thinking that is used to evaluate decision functions or logical arguments seems to depend little on randomness. Creative thinking - inventing proofs, constructing metaphors - could very well profit from random influences.